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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
LIMITS OF MACROECONOMIC
COOPERATION
ERic A. POSNER
ALAN 0. SYKES1

ABSTRACT
The macroeconomic policies of states can produce significant costs
and benefits for other states, yet internationalmacroeconomic cooperation
has been one of the weakest areas of internationallaw. We ask why states
have had such trouble cooperating over macroeconomic issues when they
have been relatively successful at cooperation over other economic matters
such as internationaltrade. We argue that although the theoretical benefits
of macroeconomic cooperation are real, in practice it is difficult to sustain
because optimal cooperativepolicies are often uncertain and time variant,
making it exceedingly difficult to craft clear rulesfor cooperation in many
areas. It also is often difficult or impossible to design credible selfenforcement mechanisms. Recent cooperation on bank capital standards,
the history of exchange rate cooperation, the European monetary union,
and the prospects for broader monetary and fiscal cooperation all are
discussed.Finally, we contrast the reasonsfor successful cooperation on
internationaltrade policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent events highlight a range of issues raised by uncoordinated
national macroeconomic policies. The financial crisis of 2008 can be
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School. We thank an audience at
University College London for comments, and Ellie Norton and Randall Zack for research assistance.
t Robert A. Kindler Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
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blamed in part on the failure of the Basel agreements to prevent banks in
different countries from taking on excessive risk. The Basel agreements,
which imposed uniform capital adequacy regulations on banks in different
countries, were thought necessary to prevent national regulation from
driving banks overseas, but countries failed to develop and implement
sufficiently strict international rules. Then, in the midst of the financial
crisis, central banks attempted to coordinate their rescues and even interest
rate cuts. Large banks conduct operations across borders, thus, a central
bank that rescues one bank may end up helping depositors who live in
foreign countries, but central banks also may be tempted to undersupply
such a public good unless they can cooperate with each other. Reports
suggest that cooperation was at best ad hoc and incomplete. Finally, the
Eurozone crisis has demonstrated anew what happens when governments
fail to coordinate their macroeconomic policies. Here, the failure of
European governments and institutions to prevent Greece from borrowing
too much, and then their difficulty in coordinating a response to the
sovereign debt crisis in Greece and other periphery countries, helped cause
and sustain the financial crisis in Europe and plunged much of the
continent into a deep recession.
These dramatic events from the last few years are only the latest
manifestations of the limits of international macroeconomic cooperation.
Countries have tried for decades to control fluctuations in exchange rates in
the hope of reducing exchange rate risk faced by firms and stimulating
international trade. While there have been some limited successes,
countries have failed to find a lasting solution. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the gold standard limited currency fluctuations
among major trading nations, but countries left the gold standard during the
Great Depression.' After World War II, western countries established the
Bretton Woods system to manage exchange rates, but that system collapsed
in 1973.2 Since then, episodic attempts at ad hoc cooperation to address
exchange rates have largely failed. Monetary union in Europe was the
most ambitious effort, but is now in disarray.
The failures and partial failures of international macroeconomic
1.

See BARRY EICHENGREEN,

GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT

DEPRESSION, 1919-1939, at 4-12, 21-26 (1992) (explaining why the gold standard succeeded and why
it was eventually abandoned).
2. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN, MAURICE OBSTFELD & MARC J. MELITZ, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 518, 526-27 (9th ed. 2012) (outlining the rise and fall of the Bretton
Woods system).
3. See, e.g., FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING & FINANCIAL
MARKETS 476-77 (9th ed. 2010) (describing the European Monetary System implemented in 1979).
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cooperation can be contrasted with a major success in international law in a
closely related field: international trade. Leaders at. the end of World War II
saw cooperation over exchange rates and cooperation over trade as parallel
elements in a strategy of rebuilding and integrating the west. In the case of
trade, countries built the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") system and then developed it further into the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), a sophisticated institution for coordinating trade
policy and resolving disputes. Over several decades, the members of GATT
and the WTO successfully eliminated many major trade barriers, including
tariffs on goods. International trade boomed. Yet the Bretton Woods
system, which also featured a maj or international institution in the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), sputtered out in a few decades.
Other forms of macroeconomic cooperation never got off the ground
outside Europe.
In this Article, we ask a simple question: why has international
cooperation on macroeconomic matters been so much less successful than
cooperation on international trade? The answer is not obvious. Lowering
trade barriers, controlling currency movements, regulating banks, and the
like, are all aspects of modern economic regulation, and there is no a priori
reason why the first should be easier than the others.
Our answer is based on the relationship between these goals and the
nature of the decentralized cooperation that prevails among states. First,
there is a great deal more academic consensus on the benefits of lowering
trade barriers than on the benefits of the other activities. Second, the
lowering of trade barriers lends itself to rule-based cooperation, while the
other forms of cooperation cannot be reduced easily to simple rules. Rulebased cooperation is easier to maintain than cooperation that requires more
fluid forms of behavior. Third, international trade cooperation is more
amenable to self-enforcement than cooperation on macroeconomic issues.
II. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
COOPERATION
In line with earlier work, we examine the topic of international
macroeconomic cooperation from a rational choice perspective, in which
we assume that states have well-defined interests and engage in
cooperation to the extent that they can advance those interests and to the
extent that cooperation can be made self-enforcing. International law is
thus endogenous to the interests of the states rather than an exogenous
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force that compels states to act contrary to their interests. 4
A state's interest, of course, is derived from the interests of its
component parts-citizens, interest groups, government institutions, and so
forth. Some combination of these interests, we assume, will define the
state's conception of "social welfare," and thus the objectives that the state
pursues in any given policy area. Economists sometimes posit, for example,
that states maximize aggregate national economic welfare, which
corresponds roughly to the maximization of national income. 5 By this
metric, the well-being of all producer and consumer interests affected by
economic activity "counts" equally for policymakers. It is also common to
suppose that states maximize a "political" welfare function in which
various groups have different degrees of influence. 6 The differences in
influence can result because some groups are well organized politically, or
because specific groups are viewed as particularly deserving of state
assistance (the poor, for example). In still other contexts, states may be
imagined to pursue a welfare goal defined in relation to some subsidiary
policy goal(s), such as a loss function embodying an inflation target and an
output target.'
Whatever the welfare objective, it is commonplace in academic
literature, and seemingly quite realistic in practice, to assume that states
pursue the interests of their own citizens without as much (if any) regard
for the well-being of foreigners. Opportunities for international
cooperation-and thus for international law-thereby arise if the policies
pursued by states acting unilaterally have positive and negative
consequences for other states (externalities). When some activity or policy
imposes negative externalities on other states (for example, cross-border
pollution), states acting unilaterally will tend to engage in too much of the
activity, and states can benefit by agreeing to abate the negative externality.
When an activity or policy imposes positive externalities on other states
4. For the most recent statement of our approach, see ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN SYKES,
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-15 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Harry G. Johnson, Optimum Tarffs and Retaliation, 21 REV. ECON. STuD. 142,
142-43 (1953) (explaining that countries pursuing a definite social welfare policy by imposing a tariff

will gain in one special case, even if other countries retaliate).
6. See, e.g., Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GA TT, 89 AM. ECON.
REV. 215, 216 (1999) (discussing the influence of political motivations on a government's
determination of tariff policies); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protectionfor Sale, 84 AM.
ECON. REv. 833, 848 (1994) (explaining that interest groups make political contributions as a means to
influence government policy by creating power incentives for politicians that the groups' policies
influence).
7.
OLIVIER JEAN BLANCHARD & STANLEY FISCHER, LECTURES ON MACROECONOMICS 567-69

(1989).
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(such as conservation of biodiversity), states acting unilaterally will tend to
engage in too little of the activity, and can benefit by agreeing to increase
it.,
Cooperation can arise in different ways. The most straightforward is
through formal treaties among the affected states. In other areas, states may
informally converge on customary behavior that reflects a useful form of
cooperation (customary international law). 9 In still other situations,
informal promises and handshakes among public officials may be all that is
necessary (soft law).10 As we proceed through the issues in this paper, we
will see that each type of "law" has played some role in the macroeconomic
arena.
For cooperation of any sort to emerge, however, all cooperating states
must benefit from it. The requirement that states be better off by
cooperating rather than by opting out and pursuing their best unilateral
alternative may be termed the "participation constraint.""
In addition, international cooperation is possible only when it is "selfenforcing."l 2 International law has no third party enforcer akin to a court or
sheriff with the ability to seize assets or lock up violators. With rare
exceptions, the failure of a state to abide by international law is not
punished or sanctioned by force. Instead, cooperation is almost always
sustained by mutual threats of defection from the regime (or another, linked
regime)-an implicit threat that if one state cheats, others will do the same
and the benefits of cooperation will be lost."
For cooperation to be sustainable through such self-enforcement
strategies, each country must gain more, at each point in time, by
continuing to cooperate than by "cheating." Cooperation, thus, is easier
when the long-term benefits of cooperation are greater and the short-term
gains from cheating are smaller. Relatedly, cooperation is easier when
states value the future relatively highly (they have a low "discount rate"). It
is also easier when cheating is detected easily and the rules governing
cooperation are clear. It is harder when the rules are vague or complex and
cheating may be harder to identify. Finally, cooperation may become
unstable because of "shocks"-changes in circumstances that increase the
8. POSNER & SYKES, supra note 4, at 19-20.
9. Id at 50-54.
10. For a lengthy treatment of the role of soft law in international financial regulation, see
generally CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2012).
11.
POSNER & SYKES, supra note 4, at 21, 52-53.
12. Id. at 127.
13. Id at 52-53, 79-80, 127-28.
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returns to short term cheating or reduce the benefits of long-term
cooperation.14 We will have much more to say about such matters in later
sections.
III. A SUCCESSFUL COOPERATIVE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
A. BACKGROUND

The WTO, successor to GATT, has 159 members at this writing."
Since the formation of GATT in 1947, international trade in goods and
services has exploded, growing considerably more rapidly than global
output. From 1948 to 1998, trade in goods increased by 6 percent per year
in real terms, while global output increased by 3.9 percent per year.16 This
growth of international commerce is widely attributable to the
WTO / GATT system's reduction in barriers to international trade.17
Average tariff rates on dutiable imports have declined in developed
countries, for example, from an average of 40 percent or so at the founding
of GATT to 5 percent or less today.18 Over the same period, the
membership of WTO / GATT has grown steadily, as has the scope of the
legal commitments undertaken by its members.
With a few minor bumps in the road, the liberalization of trade since
the founding of GATT has steadily increased, with each successive
negotiating "round" bringing about further tariff cuts and additional
liberalization commitments on matters such as nontariff barriers and trade
in services. By contrast, the era prior to GATT was characterized by waves
of protectionism, such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 in the United
States, which substantially raised U.S. tariffs and precipitated a round of
14. See id. at 25 (discussing renegotiation, modification, and efficient breaches in the context of
treaties).
15. Members
and
Observers,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.
(Mar.
2,
2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/org6_e.htm.
16. Growth, Jobs, Development and Better International Relations: How Trade and the
MultilateralTrading System Help, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist
e/min99_e/english/book e/stak e_3.htm (last visited May 27, 2013).
17. One scholar attempted to show statistically that the law in fact did not cause the reduction in
trade barriers, which occurred independently. Andrew K. Rose, Do We Really Know That the WTO
IncreasesTrade?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 98, 98 (2004). However, the scholar's empirical method has been
persuasively debunked. Michael Tomz, Judith L. Goldstein & Douglas Rivers, Do We Really Know that
the WTO Increases Trade? Comment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 2005, 2016-17 (2007).
18.
JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 5-6 tbl. 1.1 (5th ed. 2008).
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stiff retaliatory increases abroad.19
By almost any account, therefore, multilateral cooperation on
international trade since the founding of GATT has been remarkably
successful. 20 In this section, we detail the basic logic of its economic
structure, and suggest why international trade is an issue area that is
particularly suited to stable international cooperation. It will serve as a nice
contrast to the macroeconomic policy areas that we discuss in later
sections.
B.

THE GAINS FROM COOPERATION ON

TRADE POLICY

The economic structure of international trade agreements has received
a great deal of attention from prominent international economists. Chicago
economist Harry Johnson wrote the seminal early paper on this topic,
considering the strategic interaction between two countries, each large
enough to influence the prices foreign exporters receive for their exports
(the "large country" assumption). 2' Johnson posited that each nation
maximized its national income and observed that large countries could
enhance their national incomes by imposing positive tariffs, taking the
behavior of the other nation to be fixed (the Nash equilibrium
assumption).2 2 In response to a tariff increase, foreign exporters will cut
their prices somewhat as demand for their exports weakens. Thus,
foreigners absorb part of the tariff, and the tariff revenue thus arises in part
at the expense of foreigners, who do not "count" in the national income
calculus, and whose income loss, thus, is ignored by a national income
maximizing government. Johnson proved that in Nash equilibrium, each
nation would charge a positive, optimal tariff.23 Another way to understand
Johnson's result is that the consumers of any large country collectively
have a degree of "monopsony" power over the price of imports. The
19. Id. at 5. See KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 516-17 (explaining the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 and subsequent national protectionism).
20. Whether global cooperation can achieve further liberalization, however, is unclear. In recent
years, much of the negotiating action has shifted into various preferential trading arrangements such as
free trade areas, which are permitted under GATT Article XXIV. As of this writing, protectionist
sentiment and actions by countries seem to be gaining ground. See, e.g., Pascal Lamy, Director-General,
World Trade Org., Speech at Thai Chamber of Commerce, Lamy Cautions over Protectionism, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (May 30, 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/news e/spple/sppl232_e.htm (discussing the
rise of protectionism); Reuters, IMF's Lagarde Urges Caution Over Protectionism,CHI. TRIB. (July 9,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-09/business/sns-rt-us-indonesia-lagardebre86903f2012),
20120709 _ imf-s-lagarde-protectionism-caution (same).
21. Johnson, supranote 5, at 142.
22. Bagwell & Staiger, supranote 6, at 226.
23. Id.
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consumers may be unable to organize privately to exploit this monopsony
power, but their government can do so using tariffs.24
Johnson further noted, however, that global income declines because
of such tariffs (free trade maximizes global income and the exploitation of
monopsony power reduces global income). Accordingly, in Johnson's
model, the two countries could both benefit from an agreement to eschew
tariffs, following which they might split the increase in global income in
such a way as to make each better off than before.25
More modern theorists have built upon Johnson's insight, while
questioning his assumption of national income maximization. Among other
things, if governments were all national income maximizers, then trade
agreements would provide for free trade, which they do not.26 Thus, more
recent work on trade agreements commonly posits that governments
maximize a welfare function that includes "political economy" weights,
whereby the incomes of certain groups are given more weight in the
welfare calculus. 27 Certain industries and unions may be well organized
and influential politically, for example, while other industries and
consumers may be poorly organized and less influential. Trade agreements
negotiated under these circumstances may well retain pockets of tariffs and
other forms of protection from foreign competition.
Nevertheless, the modern political economy theories retain an
essential insight of Johnson's work-"large" nations acting unilaterally
will ignore the harm imposed on foreign exporters by trade policies that
restrict imports and thus reduce the prices received by foreign exporters.2 8
This externality is ubiquitous and results from the trade policy actions of
any large nation. Because the externality is negative, theory predicts that
nations acting unilaterally will be excessively protectionist. International
cooperation to liberalize trade is valuable, therefore, and international
cooperation through trade agreements will systematically lead to greater
liberalization, precisely as we observe in practice. 29
24. Johnson, supranote 5, at 146, 152-53.
25.
If the countries are asymmetric in size, however, side payments might be required to secure
the participation of the larger country. Id. at 150-51.
26. This proposition assumes the availability of any necessary side payments among asymmetric
countries. Id. at 142, 146.
27. Grossman & Helpman, supranote 6, at 833-35. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 6, at 216,
221 (also discussing political economy).
28. Bagwell & Staiger, supranote 6, at 215-16, 241.
29. Id. at 226.
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C. SELF-ENFORCEMENT IN TRADE AGREEMENTS

Negotiations under WTO / GATT auspices involve the exchange of
reciprocal tariff concessions. Nations approach each other regarding the
markets in which their exporters would like to secure better access.
Country A will agree to liberalize its market for, say, computers, in return
for a reciprocal concession on, say, textiles. Negotiations in practice cover
thousands of products (and now service sectors as well under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS")).3 0
As a result of this exchange of concessions, and because of the
participation constraint, all of the "large" countries (think of large countries
as the countries about whose trade policies other nations care) will both
give and receive trade policy concessions. These concessions matter
importantly to their own exporters (concessions received) and to foreign
exporters (concessions given). This fact immediately suggests the
possibility of a self-enforcing regime: should country A cheat on a
concession that matters to country B, country B will respond by cheating
on a concession that matters to country A.
In the simple two country, two good models popular with economists,
only one concession runs in each direction, and each country can adopt the
simple strategy of retracting its concession in response to cheating by the
other. Because cooperation is jointly valuable, this outcome hurts both
countries, and thus cooperation is sustainable unless the short-term gains
from cheating become too great, perhaps in response to some political
shock.3 '
In the real world with dozens of countries and thousands of goods, the
basic logic of self-enforcement remains the same-cheating by one country
causes it to lose valuable concessions made to it by others. In fact, the large
number of concessions in the WTO / GATT system tends to support
sustained cooperation because even if a nation is tempted to cheat on one or
two of them, it typically does not want the system to unravel altogether. All
nations, thus, have an interest in cabining disputes to protect the broader
gains from cooperation on vast numbers of other matters.
The

WTO

dispute

settlement

system

helps

to

orchestrate

30. Services Trade, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/serve/serv
e.htm (last visited May 31, 2013).
31.

KYLE BAGWELL

95-110 (2002).

& ROBERT

STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
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cooperation. 32 It has an arbitration-like procedure to identify violations and
to calibrate the allowable retaliation in response to any proven violation.
The system also has the capacity to resolve disputes over the meaning of
the rules, so that disagreements over ambiguous legal obligations do not
degenerate into trade wars. Nevertheless, the basic structure is as theory
would predict-when a cheater is identified and refuses to cure
misconduct, aggrieved nations can suspend commensurate concessions
made to the cheater in retaliation.33 The stability and growth of
WTO / GATT membership, and the success of the institution in bringing
down global trade barriers, is a testament to the success of this selfenforcing structure.
Other features of the international trade regime have also contributed
to the success of cooperation. Trade barriers are in large measure fairly
transparent-exporters know if they have to pay a tariff to get their goods
across a foreign border and how much they will pay. They can tell when a
quota is keeping their goods out of a potential market. One can also write
tariff commitments in simple and clear terms-the tariff on widgets shall
not exceed 10 percent of their value, for example. Finally, the
WTO / GATT system includes some explicit mechanisms to adjust the
bargain in response to shocks. Explicit authority for tariff renegotiation is
contained in GATT Article XXVIII, for example, and nations may deviate
temporarily from tariff commitments if an importing industry is suffering
serious injury due to an import surge under GATT Article XIX.34 Such
rules create "pressure valves" that allow strong political demands for
deviation from commitments to be addressed without causing cooperation
to unravel across the board.
The discussion above has emphasized cooperation under
WTO / GATT auspices, but, of course, dozens of other international trade
agreements also operate successfully in accordance with similar logic. The
United States alone now has a dozen or so free-trade agreements with
various nations, the most important being the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA"). Negotiations toward a larger Trans-Pacific
32. For empirical analysis of this institution that suggests that it is fairly effective, see CHAD P.
BowN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE 45-62 (2009); MARC L. BUSCH & ERIC REINHARDT, SWED. INT'L
DEV. COOPERATION AGENCY, TRADE BRIEF ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 4-5 (2004), availableat http://www9.georgetown.edulfaculty/mlb66/
SIDA.pdf.
33.
Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the World Trade Organization,31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 188-89 (2002).
34. Id. at 185-87; Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguarde": A Positive Analysis of the
GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 255-56 (1991).
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Partnership are now in progress. Almost all other nations also belong to
various preferential trading arrangements.
An important dimension of international cooperation under the
Articles of Agreement of the IMF is also driven by the gains from
international cooperation on trade. Pursuant to IMF Article VIII, section
(2)(a), members are not permitted (without permission of the Fund) to
impose restrictions on the conversion of domestic to foreign currencys
when needed to finance "current account" transactions, that is, transactions
in goods and services (as opposed to capital transactions such as real estate
or stock investments). 36 This provision was also a response to pre-GATT
practices by many nations. For example, prior to the creation of the IMF,
some nations established multiple exchange rate systems that required
domestic currency to be purchased at inflated rates for certain trade
transactions, mimicking the effect of a tariff.37 By ending such practices,
IMF Article VIII facilitates trade cooperation by increasing the
transparency of trade barriers and making commitments under
WTO / GATT auspices more credible.3 This feature of the IMF system has
proven quite successful and robust over time, even as other aspects of IIF
cooperation on exchange rates have failed (as we discuss below).
IV. A QUASI-SUCCESSFUL REGIME: INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
ADEQUACY REGULATION
A.

BACKGROUND

The financial crisis that began in 2007 has had a devastating effect on
the economies of many major countries. Global GDP fell by 1.9 percent in
real terms in 2009, after having grown by 3 percent annually over the
previous nine years. 9 In the United States, the unemployment rate reached
35. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. VIII, § 2(a), July 22, 1944, 59
Stat. 512 (1945) [hereinafter IMF], availableat http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa.
36. KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 300-01.
37. To a degree, these practices continued after the formation of the IMF and were a source of
numerous disputes. KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION INTHE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 131-32 (1982).
38. IMF, supranote 35, art. VIII, § 2(a).
39. Tatiana Didier, Constantino Hevia & Sergio L. Schmukler, How Resilient Were Emerging
Economies to the Global Crisis? 9 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 5637, 2011), available at
sciie.ucsc.edulJIMF4/WPS5637_Schmukler.pdf For further data on the financial crisis, see generally
GEOFFREY GERTZ, JOHANNES F. LINN & LAURENCE CHANDY, BROOKINGS INST., TRACKING THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMF'S WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (2009),
availableat http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2009/05_financial-crisis-linn.aspx.
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10.1 percent in 2009, while in the European Union it reached 9.7 percent in
2010.40 The recovery has also been anemic. The U.S. economy grew by an
estimated 2.2 percent in 2012, while Europe has fallen back into recession,
in large part because of the sovereign debt crisis.4 1
Economists generally agree that the severe downturn was precipitated
by the failure or potential failure of important financial institutions and the
resulting tightness (and feared future tightness) in credit markets. The root
cause was a dramatic reduction in the value of certain assets held by major
banks and other financial institutions, largely in the form of mortgagebacked securities. During the housing market bubble in the United States,
many lenders issued mortgages to questionable borrowers whose ability to
repay was suspect, often under adjustable rate contracts with unaffordable
future payments. They did so in part with the (ex post inaccurate)
expectation that housing prices would continue to rise, and that borrowers
could simply refinance and use home equity to cover their obligations. In
addition, the lenders knew that they would not ultimately hold the
mortgages themselves, but that they would be sold off and packaged as
mortgage-backed securities to be purchased by other investors. Enormous
numbers of these securities were marketed to financial institutions around
the world.42 Foreign holdings of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac backed
securities increased from $186 billion in 1998 to $875 billion in 2004, and
foreign holdings of asset-backed securities reached $835 billion at the
height of the boom. 43
When the housing price bubble burst, many houses fell in value just as
increased payments under adjustable rate mortgages began to become due.
40. Suzanne Casaux & Alessandro Turrini, European Comm'n, Post-Crisis Unemployment
Developments: US and EU Approaching?, ECFIN ECON. BRIEF, May 2011, at 1, 2, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/publications/economic-briefs/2011/pdfleb 13en.pdf.
41. The World Factbook: Country Comparison::GDP-RealGrowth Rate, CENT. INTELLIGENCE
(last
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook//rankorder/2003rank.html
visited July 6, 2013). Cf Edward P. Lazear, The Worst Economic Recovery in History, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 3, 2012, at Al 5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023038165045773114
70997904292.html ("Who knows what 2012 will bring, but the current growth rate looks to be about 2
[percent]....").
42. BRUMMER, supra note 10, at 211-13 (outlining the 2008 financial crisis). See also
KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 543 (explaining that the abrupt rise in interest rates in
the United States beginning in 2005 left many borrowers unable to sustain their monthly mortgage
payments).
43. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 104 (2011)
[hereinafter INQUIRY REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf; Steven B. Kamin & Laurie Pounder DeMarco, How Did a Domestic Housing Slump Turn
into a Global FinancialCrisis? 8 (Bd. Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., Discussion Paper No. 994, 2010),
availableat www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2010/994/ifdp994.pdf
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Many borrowers defaulted, and the resulting oversupply of housing for sale
caused prices to fall even more rapidly. Even though many borrowers
remained solvent and continued to service their mortgages, no one knew
exactly which mortgage-backed securities were backed by defaulting
borrowers, and the value of all of them fell precipitously."
This decline in the value of mortgage-backed securities occurred
within a regulatory environment in which banks (and some other financial
institutions) are ordinarily required by national regulators to maintain a
"capital" cushion to protect depositors against a decline in the value of the
bank's assets. The logic of this "capital adequacy management" is that
when the value of assets falls, the bank's shareholders (and perhaps
bondholders) will suffer the loss, and the bank will still have enough
money to pay off its liabilities to depositors and certain other creditors. 45
Capital adequacy regulation ensures that the bank's net worth is
sufficiently high that the bank will not become insolvent as a result of
moderate shocks to the value of its assets.
Following a drop in the value of assets, regulators in principle will
require banks to increase their capital holdings back to the required level by
raising capital or retaining earnings. Banks that are unable to do so may be
closed or taken over by their governments (as happened to a number of
banks during the financial crisis).
B. THE GAINS FROM COOPERATION ON CAPITAL ADEQUACY
REQUIREMENTS

The "welfare objectives" implicit in capital adequacy regulation are
straightforward-a desire by national authorities to limit undue risk taking
by financial institutions and to ensure that banks remain capable of meeting
their obligations to depositors. The economic justification for such
regulation is a belief that the owners and managers of banks are not
monitored adequately by their creditors to ensure that they do not engage in
excessive risk taking. An important reason is the widespread institution of
deposit insurance, which dulls the incentive of depositors to worry about a
prospect of bank insolvency and explains why governments regulate to
protect their treasuries. Moreover, even absent deposit insurance, creditors
may face a collective action problem in monitoring banks, and the
44. See INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 43, at 222-23 (finding that, although a relatively small
percentage of homeowners were actually defaulting, 75 to 90 percent of securities based off mortgages
were downgraded to "junk"); KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 603.
45. MISHKIN, supranote 3, at 237.
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temptation to free ride may allow banks excessive leeway to gamble with
other people's money-a gamble in which the bank enjoys the upside and
others suffer much of the downside. 46
Capital adequacy regulation originated at the national level. But in the
modern economy, capital investment has become more and more mobile
internationally. Many developed countries have increasingly relaxed so
called "capital controls" on foreign investment, allowing investment capital
to flow wherever returns are the highest. 47 The result is a set of significant
externality problems with regulation.
First, significant numbers of creditors of domestic financial
institutions may well be foreign nationals. As usual, theory suggests that
the interest of foreign nationals may not be taken into account adequately
by national regulators (at least to the degree that the national government
does not insure their interests), which may lead to a tendency toward
underregulation when nations act unilaterally.
Second, and probably more important, the regulated entities
themselves are backed by mobile capital. If the United States raises capital
requirements on major banks in New York, for example, those banks may
well have the capacity to move their operations to London. To the degree
that political officials value the presence of domestic financial institutions,
and those institutions have a credible threat to move their operations abroad
in response to stricter regulation, regulators may be further discouraged
from imposing appropriate capital requirements.
These problems became increasingly prominent in the 1970s and
1980s, finally resulting in the first Basel Accord (Basel D in 1988, in which
the so called G10 economies agreed on minimum capital requirements to
be implemented in their domestic laws.48 The approach to regulation was
modified and broadened to more countries in the Basel II Accord of 2004,49
which was in the process of being implemented when the financial crisis
emerged. Among other things, Basel II added "market discipline," based on
disclosure obligations, to the regulatory arsenal. Subsequent to the financial
crisis, yet a third agreement on capital adequacy regulation has been
reached-Basel III-which introduces further rules on bank liquidity and
46. See id. at 255-58 (discussing asymmetric information and financial regulation by
governments).
47. Louis W. Pauly, The Political Economy of Financial Crises, in GLOBAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 187 (John Ravenhill ed., 2005).
48. KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 600-01.
49. Id
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leverage. 50
C. SELF-ENFORCEMENT IN CAPITAL ADEQUACY COOPERATION

The Basel system is weakly institutionalized. Governments
established a committee in the 1970s that would become known as the
Basel Committee, which consists of the central bankers and financial
regulators of its members. The Committee has no legal power. It operates
by consensus with the understanding that when it reaches agreements, those
agreements will be independently implemented through regulation or
national legislation in the member countries.51
The complex details of these arrangements need not detain us. We
simply offer the Basel accords as an example of a quasi-successful regime
of cooperation on macroeconomic-related issues. The regime is partially
successful in that it represents a fairly stable (approaching twenty-five
years) approach to a well-defined international externality problem
attributable to global capital mobility. It responds to the underregulation
that theory predicts will arise absent international cooperation by obliging
its members to take concrete measures to require increased bank capital, as
well as to engage in certain collateral policies that reduce the riskiness of
financial institutions, and by allocating supervisory authority over
internationally active banks. The rules are in considerable measure precise
and clear. Basel III increases the common stock requirement for banks to
4.5 percent of assets, for example. 52 The system is self-enforcing in the
sense that significant deviation by national regulators (which we do not
anticipate in ordinary times) will produce substantial pressure for regulators
elsewhere to deviate. National governments have actually implemented the
Basel rules, incorporating them into domestic law and regulatory practice
where presumably they have had effects on behavior.53
The regime has been quite unsuccessful in certain respects as wellafter all, it failed to ward off the recent financial crisis. Basel II failed to
result in greater capitalization of banks; indeed, it appears to have enabled
50. The Basel III rules are summarized at Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms Basel III, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf (last
visited June 8, 2013) [hereinafter Basel III Rules]. For historical background of Basel III, see DUNCAN
WOOD, GOVERNING GLOBAL BANKING: THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL
GLOBALISATION 147-50 (2005).
51. WOOD, supra note 50, at 45-46.

52. Basel III Rules, supranote 50.
53. See WOOD, supra note 50, at 99 (discussing the impact of the 1988 Basel Accord on the
market); id. at 153-57 (surveying the effects of the regime as a whole).
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large financial institutions to reduce capitalization by a fairly substantial
amount. 54
There are three important reasons for the reduction in capital. First,
bank regulators operating under Basel I and II simply did not appreciate the
systemic risk associated with innovative financial instruments such as
mortgage-backed securities. The risk associated with these instruments was
far greater than either regulators or market participants realized, and thus
the risk posture of many major financial institutions was far more
aggressive than the capital adequacy standards in place were designed to
address.5
Second, a number of scholars believe that Basel was captured by large
banks, which manipulated the process in order to ensure that they would be
regulated lightly.56 One of the innovations of Basel II was a rule that
permitted banks to use their own models in order to calculate credit risk
instead of complying with the default capital adequacy standards, which
were quite crude. Only large banks could afford to run those models and
take advantage of this rule, and those banks were able to reduce their
capitalization while other banks were required to increase capitalization. 57
One scholar traces this rule and related rules to an intense lobbying
campaign undertaken by the large banks. 58
Third, international cooperation in this area has also been hampered
by another fundamental problem rooted in the very nature of capital
adequacy regulation-a time inconsistency problem. In popular discourse,
54. Ranjit Lall, Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III Is Doomed 7 (Global Econ.
at
2009/52,
2009),
available
Working
Paper
No.
Governance,
http://www.globaleconomicgovemance.org/wp-content/uploads/GEG-Working-paper-Ranjit-Lall.pdf
55. INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 43, at 20-22, 99-100.
56. See, e.g., Stephany Griffith-Jones & Avinash Persaud, The Political Economy ofBasle II and
Implications for Emerging Economies 5 (Apr. 4, 2003) (unpublished seminar manuscript), available at
http://www.eclac.cl/noticias/discursos/2/12152/Griffith-Jones-Persaud.pdf (arguing that the limited
regulation of large banks relative to smaller banks is an indication of industry capture); Lall, supra note
54, at 11-12 (arguing that financial institutions that were the first movers in counseling the Basel
Committee exerted the most influence).
57. INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 43, at 171.
58. Id. For related accounts of the "failure" of Basel, see MAGNUS BERTLING BJERKE,
NORWEGIAN INST. OF INT'L AFFAIRS, EXPERTS, BANKS AND POLITICS: WHAT EXPLAINS THE MAKING

84, 91-92
(2007), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalOF BASEL
II?
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots59 =Oc54e3b3-le9c-bele-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng-en&id=48049
(arguing that Basel II was excessively influenced by narrow national interests because of the differing
national regulatory regimes), and Griffith-Jones & Persaud, supra note 56, at 1-2 (arguing that
developed countries used the process to take advantage of developing countries by disincentivizing
investments in developing nations that would diversify portfolios); see generally WOOD, supra note 50
(arguing that United States weakened regulation to advance interests of U.S. banks).
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this problem is also known as the "too big to fail" issue." If the incentives
associated with capital adequacy regulation are to perform properly,
regulated institutions must believe that the rules will be enforced if the
institution finds itself in financial trouble-shareholders will be wiped out,
the bank will be closed and liquidated, and so forth. If a financial crisis
afflicts an enormous financial institution, however, much less a cluster of
them as occurred during the financial crisis, the threat to enforce the rules
can lose its credibility. The disruption to the economy from closing large
financial institutions may be extensive, producing a crisis of confidence
that produces a run on other financial institutions and imperils their
liquidity. In addition, the costs to the treasury of closing big institutions and
making good on deposit insurance promises can be enormous. The result is
that regulators can be dissuaded from enforcing the rules in the event of a
systemic crisis, and central banks are pushed inexorably toward supplying
financial institutions with the resources to cover their losses (a "bailout").60
If major financial institutions can anticipate this scenario (and they
surely can, because it has happened), they will know that in hard times the
rules will not be enforced. That will diminish the incentive to avoid
excessive risk taking and undermine the integrity of the regulatory regime.
For these reasons, we suspect that international cooperation under a
regime such as Basel III can be expected to work well only in ordinary
times when occasionally banks may find themselves in trouble but the
system as a whole is not threatened. Its ability to avoid large, systemic
crises, by contrast, is more suspect.6 '
Systemic crises might be avoided, to be sure, by imposing such
substantial capital requirements that all banks can be insulated from
massive unanticipated shocks. The costs of restricting bank activity to this
extent may easily exceed the benefits, however, and in any case may not be
politically viable. Alternatively, regulators might seek to become more
deeply involved in managing bank asset portfolios by placing more
restrictions or prohibitions on particular types of risky investments. The
ability of regulators to do so in a useful fashion may be doubted, however,
particularly in light of the fact that the assets that nearly brought down the
financial system in 2007-2008-mortgage-backed securities-were not
59. INQUIRY REPORT, supranote 43, at 369.
60. Id. at 352. See id. at 57, 228, 369 (providing examples of the costs of potential depository
runs).
61.
This seems to be the conclusion of a book length examination of the Basel system, which
describes the success of the system as "limited": it has not prevented crises, but it has contributed to
international financial stability. WOOD, supranote 50, at 4.
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recognized for the risks they created until it was far too late. Lastly, as
some have advocated,62 the largest banks "too big to fail" might be broken
up into smaller banks, but the costs of fracturing such large national or
global financial institutions may be a significant loss of scale economies
and other efficiencies and may again be a political nonstarter.
V. A FAILED REGIME: FIXED EXCHANGE RATES (AND THE
EUROZONE?)
We now move into more complex areas of macroeconomic policy in
which international cooperation has proven a failure despite the presence of
important international externalities. As we shall see, the complexity of the
policy issues in play is a key reason for the failure of cooperation, although
not the only reason. In this section, we consider various historical efforts of
the international community to establish a regime of fixed exchange rates.
After some background discussion, we consider the gold standard, the
Bretton Woods system under the IMF, and the role of currency unions with
emphasis on the Eurozone. The next section considers a broader set of
issues pertaining to monetary (and fiscal) policy cooperation.
A. BACKGROUND ON EXCHANGE RATES
An "exchange rate" is the price at which one national currency may be
sold for another. From the perspective of a national of any country, the set
of exchange rates on various currencies are simply the prices of foreign
monies.
In a world without foreign commerce, exchange rates would be of no
interest to anyone; all transactions would be domestic and no one would
have any need for foreign money. Once trade in goods, services, and capital
assets becomes possible, exchange rates become important. Consider a
seller of goods in the United States and a buyer in Europe. The seller would
like to exchange goods for dollars, which she can spend in the United
States. The buyer, however, will normally only own Euros. So, in order to
engage in a transaction, either the buyer will need to exchange euros for
dollars and give the seller dollars, or the seller will need to exchange the
62. See, e.g., Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Efficient Banking Act of 2010, S. 3241, 111th Cong.
(2010) (proposing legislation that breaks up banks that are too big to fail), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-1 11s3241is/pdflBILLS-l 1ls3241is.pdf; Jonathan R. Macey &
James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to FinancialRegulation,
120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1403-05 (2011) (arguing that when a bank becomes too big to fail, it should be
broken up).
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euros she receives for dollars. Whichever the case, one party will need to
exchange local currency for foreign currency. To do so, the party will
typically go to an intermediary such as a bank, which owns both types of
currency. The intermediary will offer to make an exchange at the prevailing
exchange rate.
1. Market-Determined Exchange Rates
What determines the exchange rate? Consider a simple setting,
without any government intervention by assumption, where people in two
countries (one European and the other American) trade goods and services
across borders, but do not trade capital assets (again by assumption).
Europeans will sell goods and services to Americans, for example, only as
long as Americans sell goods and services in return that Europeans want to
buy, and vice versa. Trade must "balance" in the sense that the value of
what the United States imports from Europe equals the value of what the
United States exports to Europe.6 3 If Europeans start buying more imports
than they sell in return, the excess demand for U.S. dollars to make the
purchases will cause the dollar to appreciate relative to the Euro, which in
turn will cause American exports to become more expensive for Europeans,
which will cause Europeans to import less and trade to return to balance. In
this simple framework, the dollar-euro exchange rate is the relative price of
the two currencies that balances export and import demand and supply.64
In turn, any exchange rate movements under these circumstances
reflect changes in export and import demand and supply factors. If, for
example, prices rise in the United States (maybe a strike or storm reduces
the cotton crop), then European demand for the now more expensive goods
will decline. Europeans will then demand fewer dollars, and the dollar will
depreciate. If Europeans become more enamored with American goods,
then they will demand more dollars to buy those goods, and the dollar will
appreciate. If American industry becomes more productive, then U.S.
goods will become cheaper, Europeans will demand more of them and thus
the dollars to buy them, and the dollar will appreciate. If the American
government imposes tariffs on European goods, then Americans will
63. Formal models of balanced trade typically omit exchange rates altogether; instead, they
simply require that the value of imports equal the value of exports measured in terms of some numeraire
good. AVINASH K. DIXIT & VICTOR NORMAN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A DUAL, GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 80-82 (1980).

64. With more than two countries, bilateral trade need not balance, but aggregate imports and
exports for each country would balance, and equilibrium exchange rates would ensure this marketclearing condition holds in each country. Id.
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demand fewer European goods and the euros to buy them, and the dollar
will appreciate, causing American exports to decline as well. And so on.
In the real world, balanced trade does not necessarily occur because
the purchase of goods and services from abroad is not the only possible use
of foreign money. When Europeans start buying more American exports,
Americans might take their additional euros and use them not to buy
European goods and services, but to buy European capital assets, including
European sovereign and corporate bonds, stocks, real estate, and so forth.
Such transactions in capital assets afford an alternative use for foreign
currency, and so the equilibrium exchange rate (without government
intervention) is not the rate that balances trade in goods and services, but
that which balances the demand and supply of foreign money, a component
of which is associated with capital transactions.
National income accounting distinguishes between the "current
account," which refers to trade in goods and services, and the "capital
account," which refers to investments of various sorts. In our example
above, Europe has a current account deficit if it imports more goods and
services than it exports, but also has a capital account surplus because
Americans use the surplus euros to purchase European capital assets. The
exchange rate may remain stable under these circumstances even though
trade flows alone are unbalanced.
The willingness of investors to use foreign exchange to buy foreign
capital assets depends on the relative rate of return on investment across
countries. If the interest rate on bonds in Europe is high relative to that in
the United States, then European bonds will be more attractive, other things
being equal, and Americans will be more likely to buy them. In valuing
European assets, Americans will take account of all the other factors that
affect their expected return-for example, future price levels, demand,
trade barriers, and productivity. Absent restrictions on international capital
flows, exchange rate equilibrium requires that the risk adjusted rate of
return on assets denominated in each currency be the same; otherwise,
capital flows will chase higher returns until parity is achieved.65
2. The Exchange Rate with Government Intervention
It is not immediately obvious why governments should wish to
intervene in exchange markets. The market is extremely liquid-trillions of
dollars of foreign exchange are traded every day. Nothing we have said so
65.

KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 339-43.

2013]

LIMTS OFM4CROECONOMC COOPERATION

1045

far suggests that the market creates negative externalities.
Nonetheless, governments have intervened frequently in foreign
exchange markets, and even when they do not consciously "intervene,"
their policies may affect exchange rates. The mechanism of direct
intervention is fairly simple. If a nation wishes to lower the price of its
currency, it sells that currency for foreign currencies-the increased supply
of its currency will tend to depress the price, just as increased supply into
any market with fixed demand will tend to lower prices. A nation that sells
its currency and accumulates foreign currency builds up "foreign exchange
reserves." Likewise, if a nation wishes to increase the price of its currency,
it reverses the process and sells foreign exchange reserves to buy up its
currency. By creating additional demand for its own currency, the nation
should cause its currency to appreciate. 66
When nations intervene for the purpose of altering the exchange rate,
they do so for a number of reasons relating to the fact that short-term
exchange rates can fluctuate dramatically. One is that firms may be
unwilling to engage in foreign trade because of the attendant risk.67 An
American firm that promises to pay C1000 for a widget in one week, may
be willing to enter the contract at the current exchange rate, where the
dollar cost is, say, $1200, but not at an exchange rate where the cost could
be $1500 or $2000 for the E1000 needed to consummate the contract. Even
if current exchange rates were unbiased predictors of future rates, so that
adverse shifts were no more likely than favorable shifts, risk-averse traders
would curtail their trading activity due to this "exchange risk."
To address the problem of exchange risk, countries have tried at
various times to maintain a relatively constant exchange rate through
government intervention. A country may do this unilaterally by "pegging"
its currency to that of a foreign country, such as the United States. 68 The
country attempts to calculate the long-run exchange rate and then use
government intervention to counter short-run deviations from it.69
Alternatively, the government may intervene in currency markets simply to
dampen volatility and reduce risk by countering any short-term price
swings.
The empirical importance of exchange risk in trade is unclear, but
economists doubt that this problem is as serious as it first appears in
66.

MISHKIN, supra note 3, at 463-68.

67.

PETER H. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 432 (9th ed. 1991).

68.
69.

MISHKIN, supra note 3, at 486.
For more information on pegging, see id. at 486-88.
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modem markets due to a large market in derivatives that enables firms to
hedge cheaply against exchange rate risk.70 The firm in the above example
can simply enter the forward market and purchase the necessary euros at a
determinate rate for delivery on the date when payment under the contract
is required.
A second concern regarding short-term exchange rate fluctuations is
that they may send false signals to the market that distort resource
allocation.7 ' Governments may fear, for example, that speculators will
distort the price of its currency relative to some "true" value that reflects
long-term market equilibrium. 72 Such behavior might cause investors to
invest in the wrong industries-for example, in the export industry of a
country whose currency has been forced down artificially, but which will
rise to its true value after the investments have been sunk. If governments
can perceive the true value of the currency, however, then they can counter
these short-term movements away from equilibrium rates and thus prevent
the price distortions. This can be true only if the government has better
information than the market does and can identify the true value of the
exchange rate, which many economists doubt is possible.
Countries may also intervene in foreign exchange markets to increase
domestic employment by retarding imports and stimulating exports
(through devaluation), a policy that may effectively amount to cheating on
trade commitments. 73 If Chile and Peru agree to eliminate tariffs on each
other's exports, then each country will experience growth in its export
sector, but import-competing industries will suffer. The import-competing
industries will then pressure the governments to help them. If a government
decides that it cannot renege on the trade deal, it can at least temporarily
produce an effect similar to that of a tariff by devaluing its currency,
making imports more expensive in terms of domestic currency. Indeed,
such a policy would help its exporters as well by making exports cheaper in
terms of foreign currency. 74
In addition to these reasons for intervention aimed at altering
70.
71.

LINDERT, supra note 67, at 434.
RICHARD N. COOPER, IMF Surveillance over Floating Exchange Rates, in THE

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN WORLD EcoNOMICS 139, 141-43 (1987) [hereinafter

IMF Surveillance].
72. LINDERT, supra note 67, at 416-20.
73. IW Surveillance, supra note 71, at 142.
74. The discussion here assumes that imports are priced in foreign currency and exports in
domestic currency, a condition that need not always hold. It also assumes that other prices do not adjust
to offset the exchange rate movement, another assumption that may not hold, especially in the long run.
We have more to say about such issues below.
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exchange rates, many government policies can affect exchange rates by
changing the supply or demand for domestic currency. For example,
countries may prefer to keep certain capital assets in domestic hands
because of political and national security sensitivities.7 5 As an illustration,
the United States has refused to allow Chinese and Middle Eastern entities
to purchase sensitive installations such as ports.7 1 Other countries have also
limited foreign investment in marquee firms such as national airlines.
When investments are prohibited for such reasons, demand for the
domestic currency falls and the currency may depreciate.
Relatedly, some countries limit foreign investment because experience
has taught them that foreign investors may withdraw their investments
precipitously when problems arise. As the Asian financial crisis of the
1990s showed, the rapid withdrawal of foreign capital can produce a
collapse in local currency and asset values, resulting in enormous economic
dislocation. One way to control such behavior is to limit the right of foreign
investors to convert their currency into and out of domestic currency for the
purpose of buying or selling domestic investments, a type of policy known
as "capital controls," which also have obvious exchange rate implications.
Another possibility is that nations may wish to unload foreign reserves
that they fear may depreciate in the future. China has accumulated large
dollar reserves through the years, for example, and should China fear a
future depreciation of the dollar, it might sell them, which would have the
effect of increasing the value of its currency relative to the dollar.
Exchange rates also are affected by countercyclical policies. For
example, a country's central bank may use monetary policy in an effort to
stimulate its economy. One way to do so is to make loans to banks at low
interest rates, enabling banks in turn to make cheaper loans to customers,
thus stimulating borrowing and investment. When a central bank loans
money to banks, it effectively expands the money supply, which naturally
tends to lower the price of its money relative to other things, including
foreign currency. Likewise, low interest rates reduce the return on
investments in local assets denominated in the local currency, which may
75. See, e.g., The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/intemational/pages/committee-on-foreignTREASURY,
investment-in-us.aspx (last updated Dec. 20, 2012) (detailing the process by which the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States reviews transactions that could result in control of a U.S.
business by a foreign person and determines the effect of such transactions on national security).
76. See, e.g., Deborah L. Cohen, Overseas Oversight: Sovereign Investment Boom Keeps
Lawyers Busy With More Complex Compliance, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2008, at 22, 22-24 (detailing U.S.
government vetoes of foreign takeovers of telecommunications, oil, and ports companies).
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lead investors to shift investment toward foreign capital assets. To do so,
they must buy foreign currency, which will also cause the value of foreign
currency to appreciate.
B. GAINS FROM COOPERATION ON EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS
Thus far, we have focused on reasons why a government may seek to
influence the price of its currency acting unilaterally, and how it may
indirectly influence its price through other policies. It is a short step to
identify international externalities resulting from policies that directly or
indirectly move the exchange rate.
First, short-term exchange rate fluctuations affect foreign actors as
well as domestic actors. To the degree that exchange risk is important in
trade, one might expect governments to undersupply efforts to reduce it
because some of the benefits flow to foreigners. Similarly, to the degree
that short-term fluctuations send incorrect signals to markets that distort
resource allocation, some of the costs will be borne by foreigners, and once
again, we might expect goverments to undersupply policies aimed at
avoiding exchange rate distortions.
Second and related, to the degree that exchange rates persistently
deviate from "equilibrium" values in ways that governments can identify,
the actors whose decisions are affected and who bear the costs of
subsequent "corrections" in the rates may be foreign investors or trading
partners whose sunk investments are imperiled by the return to equilibrium.
Third, and in line with some of the recent criticism of China's policies
to prevent the appreciation of the RMB, any efforts by governments to
devalue their currency to stimulate exports and to protect import-competing
industries will impose costs on import-competing firms abroad and on
foreign exporters. The net effect of such policies on aggregate foreign
welfare can be subtle,77 but there is little doubt that from a political
standpoint, foreign nations may complain bitterly about such actions.
Indeed, unanticipated devaluations may effectively renege on trade
bargains made with other nations, as noted, at least until other prices adjust
to compensate.
Such policies may also push competitors toward policy interventions
that they would prefer not to undertake. If China maintains an artificially
weak RMB relative to the dollar to simulate exports, Brazil may be forced
77. See the discussion in Robert W. Staiger & Alan 0. Sykes, "Currency Manipulation" and
World Trade, 9 WORLD TRADE REv. 583, 587-89 (2010).
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(politically) to do the same with respect to the real, lest its exports to the
United States become uncompetitive vis-A-vis Chinese exports. In response
to some shock that lowers the value of the dollar, both China and Brazil
may sell their own currencies and buy dollars to keep their currency values
low, causing domestic inflation that may have problematic internal
effects. 8
Fourth, the sorts of policies that indirectly affect exchange rates may
also impose costs on foreigners. When countries use investment restrictions
and capital controls, foreign investors may suffer reduced investment
opportunities. Such effects again require that the potential capital-importing
nation be "large," in the sense that a denial of access to its investment
opportunities will reduce the returns that foreign investors can make
because they do not have equally good opportunities elsewhere. These
costs to foreign investors are neglected when nations unilaterally set their
policies regarding foreign investments.
Similarly, countercyclical policies that affect exchange rates can have
various externalities. In response to the financial crisis, the United States
adopted a loose monetary policy hoping to stimulate the economy, driving
interest rates on many investments in the United States to unprecedented
low levels. Investors have responded by seeking to invest abroad where
interest rates are higher. This flow of investment capital abroad is not
always welcome. Various foreign governments have recently complained
that the inflow of foreign investment capital is driving up the price of their
currencies, forcing them to intervene by selling their currencies to maintain
export competitiveness. 79 The result is a concern of inflation. The capital
inflows also raise fears of asset bubbles that may eventually collapse and
produce serious dislocation.
Various forms of cooperation, in principle, can ameliorate these
externalities. Some efforts are targeted at particular, problematic practices.
With respect to intervention that might undermine trade commitments,
Article XV(4) of GATT provides that members of GATT "shall not, by
exchange action, frustrate the intent" of GATT.80 Likewise, IMF Article
78. Maurice Obstfeld, The InternationalMonetary System: Living with Asymmetry, ECON. LAB.
SOFTWARE ARCHIVE 32-34 (Nov. 24, 2011), http://elsa.berkeley.edul-obstfeld/The%20International%
20Monetary%20System.pdf. Obstfeld assumes that "sterilization is imperfect." Id. at 34.
79. Ronald 1. McKinnon, Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Interest Rate Policies, STANFORD.EDU, at 4-5
(Nov. 2010), http://www.stanford.edul-mckinnon/papers/Begga/o20thy/ 20neighbor/20interest%
20rate%20policies.pdf.
80. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XV, T 4, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/gatt47
01_e.htm.
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IV, section l(iii) provides that members "shall . .. avoid manipulating

exchange rates ... to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other
members."" Neither provision has ever been enforced in a meaningful
way, but they at least bespeak an awareness of how exchange rate measures
can undermine a liberal trading system.
Our focus in this section, however, is on various efforts through the
years to address some of the above noted externalities by creating a system
of fixed exchange rates. Fixed exchange rates obviously eliminate the
problems associated with short-term volatility, and if rates are set properly
(and adjusted if necessary) toward the long-term "equilibrium" rate, the
costs of sustained deviations from that level and abrupt subsequent
adjustments can be avoided. Likewise, fixed exchange rates prevent
devaluation for the purposes of undermining trade commitments.
Interestingly, however, efforts to create fixed exchange rates on a
global scale have failed. We now consider those efforts and the reasons for
their lack of success.
C. THE FAILURE OF SELF-ENFORCING COOPERATION ON FIXED
EXCHANGE RATES

We now address two significant efforts to maintain fixed exchange
rates. The first involved the "gold standard" of the early 1900s. This system
waxed and waned, and eventually collapsed around the time of the Great
Depression. Then, following World War II, a modified version of the gold
standard was devised under the auspices of the IMF. That arrangement, too,
collapsed in the early 1970s, leaving behind the modern system of floating
rates that persists today.
1. The Gold Standard
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most major
countries adhered to the gold standard. Under the gold standard, every
country promised to redeem its currency for gold. In the United States, for
example, a person could redeem a dollar for one twentieth of an ounce of
gold from the U.S. Treasury. In Great Britain, a pound was redeemable for
a quarter of an ounce of gold. Thus, a person who owned a pound could
convert it into five dollars by exchanging the pound for gold and the gold
for dollars. In this way, the gold standard created a system of "fixed
81.

IMF, supra note 35, art. IV, § 1(iii).
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exchange rate[s]."82

Countries were not bound by international law to adhere to the gold
standard. The standard emerged in a decentralized fashion as more and
more countries saw advantages in committing themselves to redeem their
currencies in gold, although policymakers saw the advantages of gold
convertibility for international trade and investment as early as 1867 and
agreed to move in that direction." Probably the most important argument
for using the gold standard is that it introduced monetary stability,
preventing countries from simply printing currency and causing inflation. If
the currency is linked to gold and a government issues too much currency
(promoting inflation), the holders of money will wish to redeem it for gold.
Aware of this prospect, monetary authorities exercise restraint in the
issuance of currency. The money supply then increases or decreases with
the supply of gold reserves, which was thought to be relatively stable.
Many governments were attracted to the gold standard for this reason
alone, a domestic benefit from the gold standard that did not depend on any
international cooperation.
A further advantage of the gold standard, however, was that when
many countries adopted it, a fixed exchange rate was established, which
eliminated or greatly reduced problems associated with exchange rate
fluctuations. Thus, the gold standard can be seen as a form of informal
international cooperation over exchange rates.
Modern scholarship suggests, however, that the supposed advantages
of the gold standard were exaggerated greatly.84 For one thing,
governments were free to leave the gold standard or (more commonly) to
devalue their currency by announcing that they would redeem it for smaller
amounts of gold than in the past. Thus, the gold standard did not really bind
governments, and it did not create as much exchange rate stability as
people often think. In fact, periods of competitive devaluations were
observed, in which multiple nations sought to take advantage of the way
that devaluation can stimulate exports and reduce imports.
In addition, there is a disadvantage in linking the national money
supply to gold reserves. Over the long term, the money supply should
increase at roughly the same rate that the economy grows, so that people
82. MISHKIN, supra note 3, at 470.
83. Barry Eichengreen, International Policy Coordination: The Long View, NAT'L BUREAU
ECON. REs., at 6 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c 12578.pdf.
84. Id. at 15-16; Richard N. Cooper, The Gold Standard: HistoricalFacts and Future Prospects,
1982 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoN. ACTIVITY 1, 36-37 (1982).
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will have sufficient money to engage in the greater number of transactions.
However, the supply of gold does not depend on the size of the world
economy, let alone the size of any particular country's economy, but varies
depending on the technology of gold extraction and the happenstance of
gold discovery. Under the gold standard, the production of gold varied
greatly over time leading to periods of inflation and deflation.85 The gold
standard thus does not really lead to price stability-the value of money in
terms of a quantity of gold is stable, but if the price of gold fluctuates
relative to other things, the value of money in terms of other things
fluctuates as well.
A further possible disadvantage of the gold standard is that it prevents
governments from using monetary policy for countercyclical purposes-a
common policy in practice, albeit one that is controversial among some
economists. A standard policy prescription during a recession is for the
central bank to lower interest rates to stimulate borrowing and
investment. 86 To lower interest rates, central banks may loan money to
banks more cheaply, or use money to buy up government bonds, raising
their prices and reducing effective yields in the economy. Both sorts of
policies increase the money supply, and can only be undertaken with a
gold-backed money (without jeopardizing gold reserves) if the government
concurrently acquires more gold, which may not be possible. Many
countries were on the gold standard at the start of the Great Depression. For
this reason, they could not lower interest rates without jeopardizing their
gold reserves. Today, many economists who believe in the efficacy of
countercyclical monetary policy blame the gold standard for contributing to
the severity of the economic downturn.
Not only did the gold standard interfere with expansionary monetary
policies during economic downturns, but it led to some unfortunate
externalities resulting from the strategic interaction among central banks.
Imagine that the world consists of two countries, both on the gold
standard. Each country has a central bank that wishes to preserve some
flexibility to lower interest rates in the event of an economic downturn.
Each also knows that increased demand for its gold reserves will result for
the reasons noted above. Thus, to build up its stock of reserves in
anticipation of possible economic downturns, each central bank may wish
to increase interest rates to make investment in their country more
85. Cooper, supra note 84, at 23 (Figure 4).
86. KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 488.
87. This example is inspired by Marc Flandreau, Central Bank Cooperation in Historical
Perspective:A Sceptical View, 50 EcoN. His. REV. 735, 739-40 (1997).
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attractive. Such a policy attracts foreign investment, and foreigners will be
led to trade gold for domestic currency to engage in investment. However,
if both central banks follow this policy, they may end up with higher
interest rates, which may tend to reduce economic growth, while
accomplishing little to attract foreign investment, thus, doing little to
increase their gold reserves. To avoid this unfortunate outcome, the central
banks must cooperate, and the cooperation must go beyond simply sticking
to the gold standard; they must also cooperate by agreeing not to compete
excessively for gold. This may be quite difficult to do, and such
cooperation was apparently not very successful in practice.8 8
Two key lessons emerge from the history of the gold standard. First,
with the benefit of hindsight it is not clear that it served states' interests to
maintain fixed exchange rates through the gold standard. The benefits of
fixed exchange rates (such as exchange rate stability) may not have
exceeded the costs-the reduced flexibility for addressing economic crises,
and so forth. The gold standard had the virtue of being simple and clear,
but in the end may have proven oversimple and inadequately tailored to
changing conditions. A more sophisticated form of cooperation, allowing
flexibility to deviate from the gold standard when justified, but not
otherwise, might have been possible in principle, but did not emerge in
practice.
Second, the gold standard was not self-enforcing. At first sight, it
seems like a simple coordination game: every country benefits by adhering
to the same standard, and no country does better by leaving that standard
once other countries have joined it. That view is too sanguine. When
countries experience economic shocks, it is not necessarily in their interest
to stay on the gold standard. Likewise, although nominally adhering to a
gold standard, countries could still engage in unilateral devaluation and did
so at times. Countries harmed by a decision to abandon the standard or to
devalue it had no retaliatory response that was sufficient to discourage such
conduct. At most, they could devalue or abandon the gold standard
themselves, which would sacrifice whatever benefits it might have yielded
(such as domestic monetary discipline) and would not do much to "punish"
the country that initially deviated. The theoretically optimal form of
retaliation against a single deviator whose action harms multiple countries
is a joint response, but ajoint response is itself subject to a collective action
problem, which countries were unable to overcome.
88.
at 760.

According to Flandreau, central banks were quite unsuccessful at this type of cooperation. Id.
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2. Bretton Woods
During World War II, the allied powers met in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire to discuss the post-War economic order. Two new institutions
were conceived-the World Bank and the IMF-with the latter tasked to
administer a new system of fixed exchange rates. Under this system, the
United States-by far the largest economy in the world-agreed to
exchange dollars for gold at the rate of $35 per ounce. Other countries
purchased dollars in order to establish their foreign currency reserves and
agreed to peg their currency to the dollar. Thus, if the market price of their
currency rose above the exchange rate, a foreign country's central bank
would sell their currency in return for dollars, which would force the value
of their currency back down to the official exchange rate. If the market
price of their currency fell below the exchange rate, the central bank would
do the opposite. 89
The IMF was to play a supervisory role and to serve as a lender to
countries that ran short of foreign exchange reserves. Countries initially set
their exchange rate after negotiations with the IMF; their exchange rate
would reflect what the country and IMF agreed (or hoped) was the longterm market rate, which could differ from the actual rate at any given time.
Once the exchange rate had been set, the central bank of each country
(other than the United States) was obliged to use dollars to buy its currency
and to sell its currency for dollars in order to maintain the exchange rate.
The U.S. government was obliged to maintain the dollar exchange rate with
gold, which meant that it had to agree to redeem dollars for gold at $35 an
ounce. 90
Countries that could not maintain the value of their currencies were
permitted to devalue their currencies with the permission of the IMF. The
idea was to permit "orderly" variations in exchange rates consistent with
their long-term value and to avoid short-term fluctuations. Thus, IMIF
supervision in principle would prevent countries from manipulating their
exchange rates (for example, to promote exports or otherwise to cheat on
trade agreements), while allowing them to adjust their exchange rates to
keep them in line with the fundamentals, such as relative productivity. The
IMF possessed a single carrot (or stick, depending on one's perspective). It
could lend money to countries that agreed to abide by its rules if they
experienced balance of payments difficulties due to an outflow of foreign
exchange reserves. Often, the IMF would condition such loans on changes
89.
90.

For a discussion of the Bretton Woods system, see DAM, supra note 37, 175-85.
MISHKIN, supra note 3, at 470-71.
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in government policies to abate the balance of payments problem, such as
tighter monetary and fiscal policies to support the value of the domestic
currency (so called IMF conditionality).9 '
The Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971. The main reason for its
failure lay with the central role of the United States. Unlike other countries,
the United States could not devalue the dollar; it was required to trade
dollars for a fixed quantity of gold. As other countries recovered from
World War II, their productivity increased at a faster rate than the
productivity of the U.S. economy, and thus, as required by the long-term
model of the exchange rate, the U.S. dollar should have depreciated.
Meanwhile, the United States had pursued inflationary monetary policy,
which further reduced the value of the dollar. As a result, the market value
of gold rose dramatically above $35 per ounce. An effort was made to
maintain a two-tier gold market, in which the price of gold for private use
rose much above $35 per ounce, and only central banks could redeem U.S.
dollars for gold. 92 That too proved unsustainable as the amount of U.S.
currency in foreign hands eventually exceeded U.S. gold reserves, creating
a "confidence problem."93 Central banks elsewhere became wary of
holding more dollars, as they would have to do to prevent their currencies
from appreciating. It became clear that the demand on U.S. gold reserves
would exceed U.S. ability to meet it, and in 1971 President Nixon "closed
the gold window" 94 and ended the ability of foreign central banks to
redeem dollars for gold. 95
Part of the problem also lay in the fact that as the United States
pursued inflationary policies, other nations were forced to intervene by
selling their currencies to maintain their pegs to the dollar. This policy
expanded their own money supplies and produced undesirable inflation in
their own economies.9 6
Accordingly, the system quickly unraveled. Foreign central banks no
longer had any incentive to maintain their pegs to the dollar, and most
major economic powers gravitated toward allowing their exchange rates to
91. For a debate on the virtues of "IMF conditionality" see KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ,
supranote 2, at 650.
92. LINDERT, supranote 67, at 411.
93. Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen, The Rise and Fallof a BarbarousRelic: The Role of
Gold in the InternationalMonetary System (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 6436,
1998), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w6436 (abstract).
94. THE GOLD STANDARD AND RELATED REGIMES: COLLECTED ESSAYS 16 (Michael D. Bordo
ed., 1999).
95. LrNDERT, supranote 67, at 411.
96. KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supranote 2, at 526-27.
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float in the market, albeit with periodic intervention to counter swings in
exchange rates that they deemed undesirable-a system of "managed
float." Currently, most of the major currencies float in this fashion,
although a few major economic powers (notably China) have tried to
maintain a dollar peg.
The lessons of the Bretton Woods system are similar to those of the
gold standard years. Indeed, Bretton Woods was at bottom a modified gold
standard. To the degree that it worked, the system created price stability
and reduced exchange rate fluctuations, particularly in the short term, but
this benefit came at the cost of constraining the monetary policies of central
banks in ways that became objectionable, and pressures to devalue arose
just as in the days of the gold standard. Likewise, divergence in factors
such as rates of growth in productivity across countries caused the fixed
exchange rates established under IMF auspices to diverge from long-term
market equilibrium values. In principle, the system was supposed to allow
nations flexibility to adjust exchange rates under IMF supervision, but in
practice, devaluations were politically controversial and destabilizing. If
the IMF was to prevent countries from "manipulating" their currencies
while permitting them to "adjust" them in response to structural changes,
clear rules were needed for distinguishing one from the other. It is
questionable whether the IMF had the capacity to distinguish these types of
behavior.
Likewise, the system simply was not self-enforcing. Countries with
more efficient economies and more restrictive monetary policies could sell
their currencies to maintain their pegs, accumulating gold-backed dollars
without bearing much cost to sustain the system. Countries with less
efficient economies, by contrast, or more expansionary monetary policies,
faced pressures to devalue and a potential shortage of foreign exchange
reserves (or gold in the case of the United States). Eventually, these
countries found it less costly to opt out of the system rather than bear its
costs. Put simply, changing circumstances put nations in violation of their
participation constraints, and other nations had no viable way to prevent
them from defecting.
D. MONETARY UNION AND THE EUROZONE
Monetary union takes place when sovereign states give up their
national currencies and accept a single supranational currency controlled by
a supranational central bank. The noteworthy example of a major monetary
union in modem times is the European Monetary Union established by the

2013]

LIMTS OF MACROECONOMIC COOPERATION

1057

Maastricht Treaty. 97 The monetary union began officially in 1999 with the
creation of the euro and the establishment of the European Central Bank.
Its founding eleven members were joined subsequently by six others. The
other ten members of the European Union either did not qualify under the
rules for joining the Eurozone or opted out of it.
A monetary union creates several potentially significant benefits for
its members. 98 First, because a common currency exists, commercial actors
no longer need to exchange currencies. The cost of such exchanges is
eliminated, and cross-border transactions become cheaper.
Second, monetary union eliminates exchange rate risk, simply because
everyone uses the same money. Indeed, monetary union is just a
particularly rigid type of fixed exchange rate regime in which central banks
forfeit any opportunity to devalue.
Third, to the extent that there are gains from international monetary
policy cooperation, as discussed earlier, a monetary union facilitates that
cooperation. Because there is a single central bank that controls the money
supply, that central bank can in theory "internalize the externalities" within
the union from monetary policy and avoid the possible issues that arise
when policies are chosen noncooperatively by members of the union. Note,
however, that the central bank cannot tailor policy separately to the needs
of individual members, a limitation that we will discuss shortly.
Fourth, there are possible political benefits from monetary union.
Indeed, in many accounts of European monetary integration, the political
benefits played a more important role in motivating policymakers than did
the economic benefits. In Europe, many policymakers believed that
monetary integration would help strengthen the long-term process of
European integration by further binding member states together and
establishing shared institutions.9 9 Political integration would strengthen the
stability of Europe, helping to avoid a recurrence of the wars of the first
half of the twentieth century and enable Europe to act in a more unified
way in international relations.
But monetary union also imposes costs on states. The chief cost is that
97. See
Economic
and
Monetary
Union,
EUR.
COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/economyfinance/euro/emu/index en.htm (last updated May 23, 2012) (describing
"economic integration" and economic governance under economic and monetary union).
98. For a further discussion on potential significant benefits, see KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD &
MELITZ, supra note 2, at 559-60, 566-72.
99. Id. at 564.
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it disables states from pursuing independent monetary policies.' 00 Recall
that many economists and virtually all central banks support
countercyclical monetary policy. To use a current example, Greece is mired
in a profound economic slump, while Germany has been enjoying modest
economic growth. If each country had its own central bank, then the Greek
central bank could expand the money supply, while the German central
bank could keep the lid on inflation. With monetary union, the European
central bank cannot choose the optimal monetary policy for each country
separately because there is only one money supply. Instead, the European
central bank must balance the interests of Germany and Greece, as well as
those of the other Eurozone countries, and choose a monetary policy that is
optimal for the union as a whole.
The balance of these costs and benefits depends on the setting, and is
the topic of the theory of optimal currency unions associated with Robert
Mundell.101 Mundell identifies four factors that determine whether a group
of states should create a currency union, all of which relate to the
possibility that economic conditions within the union may be more or less
variable across members.1 02
First, a currency union is more likely to be jointly beneficial if the
member states' economies are sufficiently similar, so that they are
generally subject to the same macroeconomic shocks and experience a
common business cycle. Then, the common monetary policy in the union
can respond to events that affect the members of the union more or less
uniformly. For example, two states that depend heavily on oil revenues will
be subject to much the same shocks-an increase in demand when other
countries experience economic growth or war breaks out in the Middle
East, a decrease in demand when new sources of oil are discovered in
foreign countries. These countries might make plausible candidates for
monetary union, but it would be inadvisable to add a country that suffers
significant economic downturns when the price of oil rises.
Second (and third), monetary union is more likely to be jointly
beneficial when capital and labor are mobile between members of the
union. Both of these factors are related to the problem of unsynchronized
macroeconomic shocks. If a recession strikes one state, but unemployed
workers can quickly move to the other state, the negative effect of the
100.
101.
(1961).
102.
factors.

Id. at 568-70.
Robert A. Mundell, A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, 51 AM. ECON. REv. 657, 663-64
Id. at 663. Although Mundell identifies seven factors, we have condensed these into four
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shock is less than it would otherwise be. The same point can be made about
capital mobility. Another way of putting this point is that if labor mobility
and capital mobility are high, then unsynchronized shocks are less likely to
occur in the first place, or their effects will be more limited. Thus, it is less
important for the member states to be able to pursue separate
countercyclical monetary policies.
Fourth, monetary union is more likely to be jointly beneficial when
the states have a coordinated tax and fiscal policy that allows transfers to be
made from one part of the union to another. If one state suffers a downturn
while the other enjoys a boom then the second state can stimulate the
economy of the first (or otherwise ameliorate the effects of the downturn)
by making transfers to the citizens of the other state. More generally, if the
states jointly tax the citizens of both states and implement a common
welfare system, then a downturn in one state will automatically cause
transfers from the booming state (whose citizens will pay higher taxes on
their rising incomes) to the depressed state (whose unemployed citizens
will receive transfers). Fiscal unification to this degree is possible only
when the populations in both states agree to it. This may be difficult
because people tend to believe that they are not responsible for the
economic well-being of citizens of foreign states or because people in
wealthier states fear that a common fiscal policy will result in transfers of
their wealth to people in poorer states.
On the basis of these considerations, many economists criticized
European monetary integration back in the 1990s,103 and that criticism has
proven to be perspicacious. The critics pointed out that European countries
had very different economies and so would be likely to suffer different
macroeconomic shocks, that labor (but not capital) mobility was low
because of cultural barriers, and that the European Union (and the subset of
Eurozone states) lacked common fiscal institutions and hence could not
easily make transfers across members. European policymakers apparently
believed that these problems were either minimal or could be overcome
through further integration, which would be stimulated in part by monetary
integration. One idea was that a common currency would provide symbolic
support for political integration and, thus, help stimulate European
solidarity, which could then provide the political basis for fiscal
integration. That, however, has not happened.
103. See Martin Feldstein, The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary
Union: PoliticalSources of an Economic Liability, 11 J. EcoN. PERSP. 23, 32-33 (arguing that the gains
from European monetary union would be small and might be negative from a global perspective).
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The European experience can be compared with the "dollar-zone"
established over a century ago in the United States, where one might also
have worried that there was too much macroeconomic variation across
states to justify a common currency.' 04 One difference between the United
States and Europe, however, is that in the United States both capital and
labor mobility is high because of a combination of constitutional
guarantees and a common language and culture. Moreover, fiscal
integration exists in the United States at the federal level. When a
macroeconomic shock hits one region in the United States, the existing taxand-transfer system ensures that money flows from the other regions to the
affected region. No similar institution exists in Europe.' 05
The current crisis in the Eurozone began as a sovereign debt crisis, but
the sovereign debt problem and monetary integration are closely related.
The Maastricht Treaty required member states to satisfy certain
macroeconomic standards-such as low inflation and low debt- and deficitto-GDP ratios. 10 6 It also included a no bailout clause.'o7 The idea
apparently was to persuade creditors (and voters in wealthier countries) that
more creditworthy countries like Germany would not have to bail out
weaker countries like Greece, and to reduce the weakness of the weaker
countries by compelling them to comply with sound macroeconomic
policies. Virtually all countries violated the macroeconomic standards from
the beginning, however, including Germany and France. Greece borrowed
vastly in excess of its capacity to repay. Creditors and bond rating agencies
treated Greece as creditworthy nevertheless, possibly because they believed
that Greece was not deviating too far from the standards and were fooled
by Greece's mendacious financial reporting; Germany would bail out
Greece if it defaulted; Greece's economy would grow rapidly enough to
absorb its growing debt obligations; or possibly some combination of these
reasons.
When it became clear in the spring of 2010 that Greece would not be
104. Paul Krugman, Can Europe Be Saved?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 12,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16Europe-t.html?pagewanted-print.
105. For more discussion on this topic, see C.A.E. Goodhart, Global Macroeconomic and
Financial Supervision: Where Next?, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES. 10-11, available at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl2599.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2013).
106.

KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELTIZ, supra note 2, at 564.

107. See Diane Niedemhoefer, German Court to Hear Euro Bailout Challenge July 5, REUTERS
(June 9,
2011,
12:43
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/09/eurozone-germanyidUSLDE7581ZN20110609. The no bailout clause is contained in Article 103 of the European
Community Treaty. Treaty Establishing the European Community Title VI, art. 103, Eur. Union, July
29, 1992, O.J. 192E103, availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/I 1992M/btm/ 1992M.html.
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able to repay its debts, creditors refused to lend anymore except at interest
rates that Greece could not afford. Other Eurozone members refused to bail
out Greece. As this became clear, the crisis spread to Ireland, Spain,
Portugal, and Italy. The reasons for the weakness of these countries
varied-in some of them, the government borrowed too much; in others,
the banks borrowed too much and governments were on the hook for bank
debt. In any event, it appeared that these countries too might default, and
that they, like Greece, would not be bailed out, with the result that creditors
demanded high interest rates for new debt. A further exacerbating factor is
that many banks in these countries owned Greek debt; if Greece defaulted,
then these banks might default, requiring bailouts from national
governments, putting further pressure on their finances. Thus, a real fear of
contagion arose, extending even to Germany and France. Later in 2010, the
Eurozone countries set up a European Financial Stability Facility with the
authority to make loans to countries subject to the contagion, including
Greece.10 Subsequent efforts in this vein have staved off financial collapse
for the time being, although at this writing, the situation is very much in
flux.
The European sovereign debt crisis could have happened without
monetary integration, but integration exacerbated it in three ways. First, as
noted, creditors treated the peripheral countries as more creditworthy than
they really were, possibly because they believed that other Eurozone
countries would bail them out if they defaulted. This resulted in excessive
borrowing by those countries. Second, governments of the core states
apparently encouraged their national central banks to purchase the debt of
peripheral states, creating an artificial subsidy for that debt. Third, precisely
because the peripheral countries could not use monetary policy to stimulate
their economies and avoid defaulting on their debt, the common currency
put them in a more difficult economic position than they would otherwise
face.
What will happen going forward? If optimum currency theory is taken
seriously, then breakup of the Eurozone seems to be the most likely
outcome, with countries either returning to their original currencies or the
creation of smaller currency unions (such as a "[n]euro" for northern
countries).' 09 Breakup would be logistically difficult, as well as expensive,
108.

KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELTIZ, supranote 2, at 580-81.

109. See Jerry Bowyer, Op-Ed., Euro, Neuro and Nero: Plausible Outcomes for a Continental
Crack-Up,FORBES (Nov. 30, 2011, 5:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jerrybowyer/201 1/11/
30/euro-neuro-and-nero-plausible-outcomes-for-a-continental-crack-up/ (detailing the possibility that
Northern European countries will create a smaller currency union and exclude the Southern European
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and-in the view of European leaders-politically disastrous. Thus, the
question is whether Europeans will be willing to incur the cost of an
inefficient currency union in order to maintain its political benefits. That
question is difficult to answer.
Another possibility is institutional reform, so that the costs associated
with a suboptimal currency union can be minimized. Two major reforms
have been discussed. The first is a strengthening of macroeconomic
constraints on member countries, so that the Greek experience will never
be repeated. The problem with this approach is that the constraints must be
enforced, and the usual sanction-expulsion from the monetary union-is
not credible because of the overriding desire to maintain the union. Indeed,
the problem with the Maastricht Treaty was not that the macroeconomic
criteria were too weak; the problem was that they were not enforced."l 0
Once again, the difficulty in fashioning a viable self-enforcement
mechanism lies at the heart of the problem.
The second reform is further political integration. If European states
could agree to fiscal union, so European citizens pay taxes to a European
institution, which in turn makes transfers back to them, then fiscal policy
could be used to offset some of the negative effects of monetary union
when shocks are not common but hit particular states. The problem with
this proposal is massive political resistance to fiscal union among voters in
wealthy countries, who fear that the institution will simply transfer wealth
from them to people in poor countries.''
The European experience provides an important lesson about the
limits of international law. Macroeconomic policy creates externalities, and
in theory countries can advance their self-interest by engaging in
international cooperation. Uncertainty about optimal policy and the
difficulty of implementing self-enforcement mechanisms in a volatile
environment have undermined most efforts to cooperate. Until the
European experiment, countries approached international monetary
cooperation in a cautious spirit, in general adopting ad hoc arrangements
that could be abandoned quickly. The European Monetary Union went to
countries).

110. The Maastricht criteria also were problematic because they constrained only public debt, not
private debt, when private debt could become a public responsibility, as occurred in Ireland and other
countries. See Goodhart,supra note 105, at 7.
Ill. As of this writing, Europeans, in principle, have agreed on a partial integration, focusing on
debt sharing and banking regulation, but the details, which may prove to be obstacles, have not been
worked out. See, e.g., Ralitsa Kovacheva, Is it Time for Common European Taxes?, EUINSIDE (Aug.
16, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/is-it-time-for-common-european-taxes
(describing the debate over the proposed common European tax).
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the opposite extreme by establishing a rigid treaty-based system that could
not handle large adverse macroeconomic shocks and their political
consequences. Once again, successful international cooperation on
macroeconomic affairs has proven elusive.
E. FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND CURRENCY MANIPULATION (THE
CHINA PROBLEM)
As noted, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, most major
economies let their currencies float, while other economies pegged their
currencies to (usually) their major trading partner. The system is governed
by Article IV, section 1, of the IMF agreement:
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary
system is to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods,
services, and capital among countries, and that sustains sound economic
growth, and that a principal objective is the continuing development of
the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for financial and
economic stability, each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund
and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to
promote a stable system of exchange rates. In particular, each member
shall:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the
objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price
stability, with due regard to its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying
economic and financial conditions and a monetary system that does
not tend to produce erratic disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment
or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members; and

(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under
this Section. 112
In practice, the IMF provides advice to countries about exchange rate
policies (known as "surveillance"),

encouraging them to obey these

principles. It has never adjudicated a country to be in violation of this
article. Still, it is worthwhile to ask what function the IMF might serve in
addressing externalities from exchange rate policies in the post-Bretton
Woods environment. Two goals are identified: (1) maintaining "stability,"
and (2) preventing "manipulation." But what do these mean, and are they
112.

IMF, supra note 35, art. IV, § 1.
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viable goals?
1. Stability
Exchange rate stability is, as we have seen, a value. A country that
maintains exchange rate stability confers a benefit both on its citizens and
on foreigners by reducing exchange rate risk. Exchange rate stability,
however, is only one value among many. Indeed, economists have
observed that policymakers face a tradeoff between exchange rate stability,
monetary policy autonomy, and freedom of financial flows, and can satisfy
only two of these values at the same time. If a country opts for exchange
rate stability and freedom of financial flows, then (unless it is a very large
country) its monetary policy will be determined in part by the choices of
foreign states. If a country chooses monetary policy autonomy and freedom
of financial flows, then it must permit its exchange rate to float."'
The problem for the IMF is that monetary policy autonomy and
freedom of financial flows are just as important for the economic wellbeing of a country as exchange rate stability is. Indeed, they may be more
important. If states want to attract foreign investment, then they must allow
capital to move across their borders. If states want to use monetary policy
to counter economic downturns, then they need control over monetary
policy. The optimal mix of these instruments surely varies from state to
state.
Accordingly, any simple rule requiring states to maintain a "stable"
exchange rate is likely to be unacceptable because in many cases it would
require states to forego policies that they deem important-that was a core
problem with fixed exchange rates as we have seen. Despite the goal of
"stability," states in fact desire to retain considerable flexibility. How is
such flexibility to be governed so as to avoid substantial externalities? A
rule that required states to choose the "optimal" mix of policy instruments
would clearly be unworkable; it would require so many state contingent
elements that it would be impossible to craft. No one really knows what the
optimal mix of policy instruments is, and those who think they know will
find large numbers of people who disagree. For this reason, the IMF goal of
stability is difficult to implement as a legal matter, just as the effort to
maintain fixed exchange rates during the Bretton Woods years ultimately
proved a failure. IMF staff can jawbone national governments about
stability as part of the surveillance process, and will no doubt continue to
113. KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 509-10 (describing the policy
"trilemma").
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do so, but because clear rules about what is required cannot be devised,
national authorities will retain the discretion to promote the degree of
stability that they believe serves the national interest, even if the global
interest is not always well served.
2. Manipulation 1 14
The goal of avoiding "manipulation" is focused on trade policy. Under
IMF Article IV, members are obliged not to intervene in exchange markets
for the purpose of securing an "unfair competitive advantage" in
international trade."' The fear is that a nation may artificially depress its
exchange rate in order to make its exports cheaper and imports more
expensive.
In recent years, accusations of manipulation have focused particularly
on China. For many years, China has maintained a rough peg between its
currency (RMB) and the dollar. To prevent the RMB from appreciating, it
has intervened by selling RMB and buying dollars, to the point that it has
now accumulated over $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. Over the
same period, China has often run trade surpluses with major trading
partners, particularly the United States and Europe.116
From an economic standpoint, the rule against "manipulation" may be
questioned, as its effects on other nations are unclear at best. In the long
run, exchange rate devaluations will have no "real" effect on economic
activity because other prices will adjust to offset-a consequence of what
economists term the long-run neutrality of money. By analogy, if the
United States government were to fiat that every dollar suddenly becomes
two dollars, the eventual equilibrium would involve all prices in dollars
doubling, so that in real terms nothing had changed. In the short run, things
are more complicated, but still subtle. For example, if goods are priced in
the currency of the country in which they are manufactured, and an
unanticipated reduction in the value of that currency occurs, then exports
become cheaper in foreign currency and imports become more expensive in
domestic currency. This phenomenon raises the national income of trading
partners (in economic parlance, their "terms of trade" improve because
what they sell becomes more expensive and what they buy becomes
cheaper), while reducing the exporting country's national income (for the
opposite reason). It is not obvious why trading partners should complain
114.
115.
116.

This section draws heavily on Staiger & Sykes, supra note 77.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 588-89.
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about policies that increase their national incomes. 117
Nevertheless, such short-run effects may beget adverse political
reactions abroad from exporting firms and import-competing firms. Such
political considerations perhaps explain the genesis of IMF Article IV.
Likewise, Article XV(4) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
provides that members "shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of
the provisions of this Agreement."" 8 These provisions plainly evidence a
concern that currency practices may undermine certain rules of the
international trading system, including limits on tariffs and export
subsidies.
Despite extensive intervention by many countries into exchange
markets through the years, no country has been adjudicated to be in
violation of either the IMF prohibition on manipulation or the GATT
prohibition on measures that frustrate its intent. It also seems unlikely that
any country will be found to have violated these rules in the future. It is
instructive to ask why. The answer, as one of us has argued in another
paper coauthored with Robert Staiger,ll 9 is that clear rules to distinguish
manipulation from other, acceptable forms of exchange market intervention
are simply too difficult to fashion.12 0
Under IMF law,
[B]efore a[] ... member may be found to have engaged in illegal

currency manipulation to affect the balance of trade, it must have
deliberately affected the exchange rate to a degree sufficient to cause
"fundamental misalignment," and must have done so for the "purpose"
of increasing net exports. Regarding the purpose of its policies,
members' representations are given "the benefit of any reasonable
doubt." 21
Putting aside the misalignment concept, which need not detain us
here, it is exceedingly difficult to divine the purpose behind government
policies. To take the example of China, Chinese officials deny that they are
manipulating the exchange rate to increase net exports. Alternative
117. Id. at 605-06.
118. GATT, supranote 80, art. XV, T 4.
119. Staiger & Sykes, supranote 77, at 589-93.
120. For a related discussion on the difficulty of regulation, see Claus D. Zimmermann, Exchange
Rate Misalignment and InternationalLaw, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 423, 472-75 (2011).
121.
Staiger & Sykes, supra note 77, at 591. See also Zimmermann, supra note 120, at 431-32,
436 (quoting Decision No. 13919-(07/5 1), annex, 3 (June 15, 2007), in 36 Selected Decisions and
Selected Documents of the International Monetary Fund 33, 43 (2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=13919-(07/5 1)).
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accounts of their motivations, entitled to "the benefit of any reasonable
doubt" as noted above, are supported by the work of some prominent
academics. Ronald McKinnon, a well-known monetary economist, for
example, has argued that China's policies have controlled inflation within
the Chinese economy effectively and stimulated economic growth.' 22 This
argument may well satisfy the reasonable doubt standard that the IMF itself
embraces.123
The core problem here again lies in the impossibility of crafting a
legal rule that turns on verifiable information. Nations engage in monetary
policies, including exchange market intervention, for a host of reasons,
many considered benign and a proper exercise of national sovereignty. To
protect the ability of IMF members to pursue such policies, the IMF seeks
to sort cases based on the intent of the monetary authorities. Intent,
however, is unascertainable as a legal matter, and the rules accordingly
have no real force.
If the IMF offers little hope in this area, what about the WTO? GATT
Article XV(4) states that members "shall not, by exchange action, frustrate
the intent of the provisions of this Agreement." 24 Nothing in Article XV or
elsewhere in GATT provides guidance, however, as to what sorts of
exchange practices would be acceptable. Likewise, Article XV(4) has never
been interpreted by the WTO / GATT dispute system, and no case law
exists on the question of what exchange practices would violate the GATT.
A policy that runs throughout Article XV, however, is deference to
IMF rules. For example, Article XV(9)(a) states that "[n]othing in this
Agreement shall preclude ... the use by a contracting party of exchange
controls or exchange restrictions in accordance with the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund."125 A threshold question,
therefore, is whether an "exchange action" can frustrate the intent of GATT
if it is not a violation of IMF law. This question is critical in light of the
fact that the IMF would have great difficulty adjudicating China's policies
to be currency manipulation for reasons given above, and because the
WTO would almost certainly defer to the IMF on this issue if it is deemed
legally relevant.
But perhaps a violation of GATT Article XV(4) does not, as a legal
122. Ronald McKinnon, China's Exchange Rate Policy and Fiscal Expansion, STANFORD INST.
ECON. POL'Y REs. (Mar. 2009), http://www.stanford.edul-mckinnon/briefs/policybrief mar09.pdf.
123. Staiger & Sykes, supra note 77, at 591-92.
124. GATT, supra note 80, art. XV, 4.
125. Id art. XV, I 9(a).
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matter, require a violation of IMF law. Can the WTO plausibly adjudicate a
violation of Article XV(4) without IMF support? Nations undertake
macroeconomic policies all the time that have the potential to influence
trade (including, historically, some dramatic currency devaluations).
Current U.S. monetary policy, for example, has lowered interest rates and
placed downward pressure on the dollar to a degree that may well have had
significant trade impact. Such general macroeconomic policies have never
even been challenged, let alone condemned, in the WTO / GATT system. If
the WTO dispute process were now to rule that certain macroeconomic
policies affecting trade are illegal, it would open a Pandora's box with
enormous potential for political strife and tension within the system. It,
thus, seems unlikely that the WTO would find a violation of Article XV(4)
in an exchange practice that was permissible under the applicable law of
the IMF.
Thus, the WTO suffers the same essential problem as the IMF when it
confronts allegations that exchange measures "frustrate the intent" of
GATT. It is exceedingly difficult to distinguish legitimate monetary
policies from inappropriate ones. The vagueness of the standard under
GATT Article XV(4) and the fact that it has never been the subject of
adjudication in the now 65 year history of the GATT system, reflects the
difficult and perhaps insurmountable challenges of devising any sort of
clear principle for identifying problematic practices.
VI. A REGIME NOT (OR BARELY) TRIED: MACROECONOMIC
STIMULUS COOPERATION
Countries that pursue monetary policy that maximizes their national
interest will, under plausible assumptions, choose monetary actions that
harm (or benefit) other countries.12 6 Cooperation may mitigate this
problem, but as we will see, international cooperation with respect to
monetary policy is extremely difficult.
Although economists disagree a great deal about optimal monetary
policy, there is not much doubt that monetary policy can produce inflation
or deflation. When a central bank prints money, more money chases a
constant supply of goods and services, and so the value of money relative
126. See generally Giancarlo Corsetti & Gemot J. Miller, Rethinking Multilateral Policy
Cooperation in the X7 Century: What Do We Know About Cross-Border Effects of Fiscal Policy?,
(Aug.
2011)
(unpublished
conference
manuscript),
available
at
http://conference.nber.org/confer//2011/MECfl1/CorsettiMueller.pdf (describing theory and evidence
on cross-border effects of fiscal policy).
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to those goods and services declines. Conversely, deflation takes place if
the central bank withdraws enough money from the economy. 127
If economists generally agree that central banks can influence the
money supply and hence the price level, they agree much less on whether
central banks can do so in a manner that effectively advances social goals.
The most common position, and one that is reflected in the policies of most
central banks, is that central banks can smooth out the business cycle by
pursuing countercyclical monetary policy. Simplifying greatly, the theory
is as follows. During economic recessions, people are afraid to spend
money because they do not know whether they will be employed for long;
and businesses are reluctant to invest money because they do not think that
people will buy their goods. As a result, businesses fire employees, who
then are unable to buy goods, which further reduces demand in a downward
spiral. The central bank can help end a recession by increasing the money
supply. The reason is that as money becomes more plentiful, the cost of
borrowing money will decline,128 and businesses will be more willing to
borrow money in order invest. That means that they will hire workers, who
will then have enough money to buy things; the workers will also be more
willing to borrow in order to buy things, which will also result in
businesses having more money to invest. In short, by reducing the cost of
credit or money, the central bank increases aggregate demand, which
creates more economic activity.
Once good times return, however, the central bank must put on the
brakes and reduce (or stop increasing) the money supply. Once the
economy reaches full capacity, easy credit will not result in the hiring of
additional workers or the buying of additional goods and services. Instead,
the ratio of money to the value of goods and services increases, producing
inflation. Inflation generally interferes with economic activity by making
prices unpredictable, thereby creating risk, and by harming actors who are
not hedged effectively against

it.129

A central bank reduces the money

supply to limit inflation.
The efficacy of such countercyclical policies has been somewhat
controversial through the years. Early "rational expectations" critiques
suggested that economic actors would anticipate the inflationary effects of
any increase in the money supply, so that wages and prices would increase
and monetary stimulus would have no real effects (again, the long run
127.

KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 372.

128.
129.

Id. at 362.
BLANCHARD & FISCHER, supranote 7, at 568-69.
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neutrality of money scenario).' 30 Other economists responded that price
flexibility is limited, in some cases due to contracts that lock in existing
prices, so that monetary policy can have real effects in the short term.' 3'
That view currently predominates, and the current tendency among most
important central banks, as far as we know, is to pursue countercyclical
monetary policy. Nonetheless, what is good for a particular country is not
necessarily good for all countries, as we will now show.
To illustrate, assume that a central bank can affect price levels by
controlling the money supply. Imagine that two countries face an economic
downturn, and believe that it is in their interest to expand the money
supply-that is, they conclude that the benefit of increased employment
exceeds the cost of possible future inflation. The two countries are Home
and Foreign, and each can choose two monetary policies-"somewhat
expansionary" and "very expansionary."' 32 An expansionary monetary
policy reduces Home's unemployment rate, while creating a risk of
inflation. The policy might also influence economic outcomes in Foreign,
but the effect could be complex. One potential effect is that stimulus in
Home will increase demand in Home for Foreign's products, thus
benefiting Foreign's economy. Another potential effect is that stimulus in
Home will cause Foreign's currency to increase in value relative to Home's
currency by causing inflation in Home. This could hurt Foreign's export
sector and-indirectly, by causing unemployment in that sector and thus
potentially a decline of aggregate demand-the entire economy. It could
also cause asset bubbles in Foreign. As interest rates fall in Home,
investors will shift their investments to Foreign, bidding up asset prices in a
manner that may not be sustainable over time.
Let us thus assume that when Home chooses a somewhat
expansionary policy, it benefits Foreign, and when it chooses a very
expansionary policy, it harms Foreign. The same is true in the opposite
direction. Thus, the optimal outcome for both countries is reached when
both countries choose the somewhat expansionary monetary policy. It may
be in Home's interest, however, to switch from a somewhat to very
expansionary monetary policy because, for Home, the gains (in terms of
further reduction in unemployment) exceed the losses (inflation), while
130. Id at 573-75.
131.
E.g., Stanley Fischer, Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations and the Optimal Money
Supply Rule, 85 J. POL. ECON. 191, 191 (1977); John B. Taylor, Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered
Contracts, 88 J.POL. ECON, 1, 21 (1980).
132. But cf KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 2, at 554-56 (using a model that
considers the opposite policy scenario-that countries choose among restrictive monetary policies to
combat inflation).
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Home has no incentive to take into account the costs for Foreign. Foreign
has the same incentives, and thus in the absence of cooperation, both Home
and Foreign may choose the suboptimal very expansionary monetary
policy.
Can Home and Foreign cooperate in order to avoid the jointly inferior
outcome? There are two major problems. The first is the fundamental
policy uncertainty-both at the level of theory and in terms of practical
application. Economists cannot agree on monetary policy, and even if they
could, there is even less agreement in particular contexts as to how the
central bank should affect the money supply. Thus, countries may refuse to
cooperate simply because they disagree about what should be done.
A second problem is the familiar difficulty of creating a self-enforcing
agreement. Even if states can agree that (in our example) a somewhat
expansionary monetary policy is jointly optimal, while a very expansionary
monetary policy is not jointly optimal, they may not be able to reach a selfenforcing agreement that limits them to optimal actions. The reason is that
retaliation may involve actions that are costly to the retaliator and not
credible. In our example, suppose that Foreign is surprised by Home's very
expansionary monetary policy, and that its only retaliatory option is to
engage in the same policy next period. By that time, however, economic
circumstances may have changed and an expansionary policy may no
longer be in its self-interest.
Going beyond our example, the two-country assumption masks an
enormous amount of real-world complexity. Monetary policies no doubt
have important externalities, but they run in many directions among the
important economies of the world-Europe, the United States, Japan,
China, and so on. The task of orchestrating useful cooperation in this
setting-where central banks face a divergence of circumstances and a
divergence of views on optimal policies-is truly daunting.
As a consequence, about the most one can expect is occasional ad hoc
cooperation among a subset of central banks confronting an immediate
short-term problem.133 Central banks famously were unable to cooperate in
response to the Great Depression, when, at least in theory, they might have
agreed to pump liquidity into the international financial system, but distrust
in a hostile international environment and disagreement about policy
133. Eichengreen, supranote 83, at 1; Flandreau, supra note 87, at 761. For a relatively optimistic
account that argues that cooperation has increased, albeit fitfully, see Richard N. Cooper, Almost a
Century of Central Bank Cooperation 14-15 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 198,
2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/workl98.pdf.
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undermined negotiations.' 34 In subsequent years, efforts at cooperation
centered around management of exchange rates rather than coordinated
responses to global downturns. Possibly the most successful examples of
cooperation among national financial authorities were the responses to
sovereign debt crises in Mexico in 1994-1995, and Asia in 1997-1998,
where western countries launched rescues through the IMF."' After the
September 11, 2001 attack, the Fed opened foreign exchange swap lines
with a number of foreign central banks, which enabled those banks to
borrow U.S. currency from the Fed, and then relend this money to banks
located in their jurisdiction that provided loans in U.S. currency. 13 6 This
approach, which may have prevented a global downturn through injection
of liquidity internationally, was essentially a unilateral move. Foreign
central banks accepted the loans so that they could support local banks that
took deposits in U.S. dollars, not as a part of a coordinated response to
international macroeconomic conditions. Over the next several years, under
the auspices of the G20 and the IMF, countries attempted to address global
economic "imbalances" (chiefly, the worry that U.S. current account deficit
would eventually result in a sharp devaluation of the dollar, causing a
global recession), but made little progress.13 7
The financial crisis that began in 2007 posed a considerable challenge
to central bank cooperation.' 38 The central bank response began as early as
November of that year, when G20 ministers announced that central bank
governors recognized the global downturn and would cooperate in
addressing it; subsequently, the central banks of the top developing
countries announced that they would jointly pump liquidity into their
national economies. 139 The Fed opened foreign exchange swap lines with
foreign central banks, to ensure that U.S. currency would be available for
foreign loans. The European and Swiss central banks, and other central
banks, did so as well for their own currencies. 140 Subsequently, the central
134.

EICHENGREEN, supra note 1, at 12.

135. Eichengreen, supra note 83, at 23-24.
136. Douglas W. Arner, Michael A. Panton & Paul Lejot, Central Banks and Central Bank
Cooperationin the Global FinancialSystem, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 1, 21, 29
(2010).
137. Eichengreen, supra note 83, at 28.
138. For a useful account of the causes of, and reactions to the 2007 financial crisis, see
BRUMMER, supranote 10, at 210-65.
139. Eichengreen, supranote 83, at 28-29.
140. William A. Allen & Richhild Moessner, Central Bank Co-operation and International
Liquidity in the FinancialCrisis of2008-9, at 26 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 310,
2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work310.pdf.
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banks coordinated in cutting interest rates. 14 ' Countries failed to coordinate
their fiscal policies, however. Some commentators argue that the Fed
loosened monetary policy without taking into account the negative effects
on other countries, and "there is no disputing that the inability at the Seoul
G20 summit in November 2010 to agree on what constituted mutuallybeneficial adjustments in monetary and fiscal policies left potential gains
from policy coordination on the table."l 42
The success of the swap operations probably was due to the very
narrow form of cooperation they entailed: a loan from one central bank to
another, where the Fed gains from the injection of liquidity, and the
recipient gains through the support for its local banks. There is no shortterm cost from this type of cooperation and virtually no credit risk.143 The
broader and more controversial forms of cooperation involving coordinated
monetary and fiscal policies had much more limited success.
VII. EXPLANATIONS
We have discussed four areas of international economic cooperation:
(1) trade; (2) banking regulation; (3) exchange rate regulation; and
(4) monetary stimulus cooperation. We have measured cooperation in two
ways: the extent to which cooperation has been institutionalized in
international rules, international agencies, and domestic law; and the extent
to which cooperation has had positive economic outcomes. Trade
cooperation can be counted a success: it has been heavily institutionalized
and it seems to have contributed to the growth of international trade.
Banking regulation can be counted a partial success. Banking regulation is
not heavily institutionalized at the international level, but the Basel rules
have been incorporated into domestic law and probably contributed to
international financial stability in good times. These rules, however, could
not prevent financial disaster. Exchange rate regulation has largely failed. It
was institutionalized during the Bretton Woods era, but subject to a great
deal of ad hoc adjustment, it had limited impact on international exchange
rates, which were later allowed to float. Finally, central banks have largely
failed to coordinate efforts to stimulate economies during downturns, and
national governments have not even attempted fiscal cooperation, with very
limited exceptions.
What accounts for this pattern? With such a small number of data
141.
142.
143.

Id at 36.
Eichengreen, supra note 83, at 29.
Arner, Panton & Lejot, supra note 136, at 35.
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points, one can only speculate, but we will hazard the following
explanation. First, cooperation becomes possible as the expected gain from
cooperation increases. This point may seem too obvious to be worth
making, but international macroeconomic cooperation illustrates a twist,
emphasizing the word "expected." The expected gain from cooperation is a
function partly of policy uncertainty. When optimal policy is uncertain, the
gains must be discounted; in addition, there is option value in playing waitand-see, or taking modest rather than aggressive measures. The benefits,
costs, and risks of international trade have been largely understood by
economists since the early nineteenth century. Thus, the gains from
international trade cooperation could be easily predicted. By contrast,
economists disagree a great deal more about exchange rate policy, banking
regulation, and stimulus; the empirical effects of these actions are harder to
predict.
Second, cooperation becomes possible at an international level when
the behavior of interest is susceptible to rule-based regulation. Cooperation
is possible only when countries can monitor each other and retaliate in
response to violations, and monitoring is very difficult at the international
level. Thus, it is necessary for violations to be clearly defined, which is
possible only if clear rules distinguish permissible and forbidden behavior.
It turns out that some forms of cooperative behavior can be more easily
governed by rules than other forms can.
Consider first international trade. For certain types of behavior,
violations can be easily defined and punished. If states agree that the tariff
on certain goods will be no greater than X, then violation occurs when the
tariff is higher than X. Because the exporter must pay the tariff, its
existence cannot be disputed. There are harder cases, to be sure. Whether a
pollution control law is an impermissible trade barrier or a legitimate
method for reducing pollution can turn on complex evidentiary questions,
but the analytic inquiry is relatively straightforward. Even if this area of
trade law can be subject to abuse, the reduction of tariff barriers is a clear
example of success. International law in this way enables states to obtain
some cooperative benefits even if a portion of the theoretically possible
cooperative surplus lies beyond their reach.
Banking regulation provides an instructive comparison. The Basel I
system created a system of crude rules that could be mechanically applied.
It established a minimum ratio of capital to assets. It required banks to
calculate their assets by placing them into one of four risk-weighted baskets
and multiplying their value by 0, 0.2, 0.5, or 1, depending on the level of
risk. Off balance sheet items were subject to a similar risk conversion
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process. Capital was carefully defined, and then mechanical rules were
used to determine the extent to which different types of capital (common
equity, different types of preferred such as cumulative and noncumulative,
subordinated debt, and so forth) could be used for the numerator of the
capital adequacy ratio. Thus, banking agencies in different countries using
this method would likely obtain very similar results.
The algorithm, however, was too crude. A loan to a highly
creditworthy municipality and a loan to a less creditworthy municipality
received the same weight because all loans to municipalities were put in the
same basket. A bank with good management was treated the same as a
bank with bad management. A bank that reduced its risk exposure by
buying derivatives would receive no credit.'" The Basel Committee
responded with the significantly more complex Basel II rules. Basel II
permitted banks to use their own models to calculate the risk of default;
regulators may approve or reject those models but it is not clear that other
countries can evaluate the regulators' decisions. Basel II also required
regulators to evaluate banks' market risk and operational risk in addition to
credit risk-and not only that, but also systemic risk, reputational risk,
pension risk, strategic risk, and many other types of risk. Under Basel I, the
analysis of a bank could produce a single number-the leverage ratio-that
could be compared to a simple rule-the leverage limit. Under Basel II, the
analysis of a bank produced all kinds of numbers reflecting different types
of risks, and no clear way to aggregate them. The additional complexity
unavoidably required regulators to rely more on judgment, which makes
cross-country monitoring more difficult. Basel III, created in response to
the failure of Basel II to prevent the financial crisis, is even more complex.
In this case, reliance on simple rules turns out to be impossible. They
result in banks being either excessively risky or excessively constrained.
Under the more complex system, it may be too difficult for countries to
determine whether the regulators of other countries are complying or not.
However, it is too soon to tell whether Basel III will succeed or fail.
Exchange rate risk provides another setting. One might believe that
management of exchange rate would be similar to management of trade. In
both cases, countries must make a tradeoff and embody it in a system of
rules. In the case of trade, countries trade off the interests of exporters and
144.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-253, RISK-BASED CAPITAL: BANK
REGULATORS NEED To IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS To FINALIZING THE

PROPOSED BASEL II FRAMEWORK 15-16 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07253.
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import-competing firms (and possibly consumers) and agree to tariffs and
trade barriers that are mutually beneficial. Once these rules are in place,
states monitor each other for compliance.
Then why has exchange rate cooperation been so difficult? A key
reason is that exchange rates are in fact rather difficult to govern through
rule-based regulation. Any agreement on specific exchange rates quickly
becomes outdated as macroeconomic shocks lead some nations to run short
on reserves and wish to devalue their currency. A system is needed that
permits states to change exchange rates to respond to these shocks while
prohibiting them from doing so for "manipulative" reasons-for example,
to stimulate exports at the expense of other states. No mechanical formula
for distinguishing valid and invalid exchange rate policy has been
discovered, however, and so distinguishing violations is very difficult.145
Likewise, under Bretton Woods, the IMF was given supervisory authority,
but little enforcement power, no doubt because countries could not commit
themselves to trusting an agency with discretionary authority.
Finally, cooperation must be self-enforcing. Nations must have a
credible threat to retaliate against cheating that is sufficient to discourage
cheating in the first place, at least under ordinary circumstances. In
international trade, self-enforcement works because the threat to withdraw
prior trade concessions in response to cheating is perfectly credible, at least
for large countries. Political officials can benefit from such retaliation and
show no reluctance to use it when it is authorized. In the other systems we
have studied, however, retaliatory threats are inadequate to sustain
cooperation in many scenarios. If banking regulators in country A are
unwilling to liquidate failing banks in a crisis, for example, the prospect
that foreign regulators may behave similarly can be insufficient to change
their minds-here, due to shocks, nations are better off by deviating and
seeing cooperation unravel than they are by complying. The same problem
afflicts exchange rate cooperation when a nation comes under intense
pressure to devalue.
Put differently, shocks to the international trade system historically
tend to be small and sufficiently industry specific that no member can
benefit by opting out of cooperation altogether. Even when the temptation
to deviate on a particular issue arises, the value of cooperation on many
145.
Compare with Barry Eichengreen's discussion of the dispute over whether quantitative
easing was currency manipulation, as alleged by foreign countries. Barry Eichengreen, Mr. Bernanke
Goes to War, NAT'L INT. (Dec. 16, 2010), http://nationalinterest.org/article/mr-bemanke-goes-war4573.
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other issues remains and participation in the system is stable.
Cooperation in the trade area also benefits from the fact that retaliation
can be targeted directly at the violator. If Europe cheats on a commitment
to the United States, the United States can respond with a discriminatory
tariff on important European exports to the United States. If Japan cheats
on an exchange rate commitment by devaluing the yen, the United States
could respond with measures to devalue the dollar, but those measures
would affect many other nations (and currencies). In this scenario, only a
coordinated response involving all major currencies other than the yen can
move the world toward the status quo ante, but such coordinated responses
may be much more difficult to orchestrate. Similar problems can arise with
banking regulation and other types of monetary policy coordination.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our Article might seem excessively pessimistic, but that would be a
misinterpretation of it. If it had been written in 1940, it would have been
regarded as excessively optimistic. We suspect that from 1945 to the
present, countries have exploited all or nearly all the gains from
international macroeconomic cooperation that are possible under the sort of
rules-based system that can be the subject of international law. Particularly
from 1990 to 2001, international conditions were about as favorable as they
have ever been for international cooperation, so it is predictable that
countries would have exploited whatever gains were available. Further
gains can be obtained only through the merger of states, so that central
banks and other financial regulators could exercise discretionary authority
over a larger population. That is what the Europeans tried, with mixed
results, probably because the European economies are not sufficiently
integrated and European populations lack sufficient solidarity.
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